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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on an operational organisation for WEU: 
naval and maritime co-operation 
(i) Convinced of the importance of a WEU capacity to carry out naval and maritime operations, given 
the fragile nature of international relations in many parts of the world where European interests may be at 
stake; 
(ii) Pleased that, as forecast, the NATO summit meeting on 10th January 1994confirmed WEU's position 
as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and formally recognised the European defence identity; 
(iii) Regretting therefore that the North Atlantic Council should choose now to downgrade the single 
major NATO commander's post occupied by a European and effectively abolish the Channel Command 
which, created by the Western Union, antedates NATO: 
( iv) Welcoming the willingness of the WEU Council to establish pragmatic arrangements for current 
naval, maritime and riverine operations; 
(v) Recalling previous recommendations of the WEU Assembly to: 
- " ... create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, air-
borne early warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under 
single command and unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's 
security interests are at stake in emergency or war;" (1988); 
- " ... give practical expression to the European pillar of defence: 
(a) encourage more multinational units such as the United Kingdom-Netherlands landing force 
and the Franco-German brigade; 
(b) take specific action to allow at an individual level the exchange of military personnel bet-
ween countries to enhance their awareness of European co-operation, give them greater 
opportunity for travel and a more interesting work environment, and serve as a useful 
recruiting incentive at a time when the demographic levels are making recruiting most 
difficult;" (1989); 
- " ... examine for the longer term the idea of creating a WEU naval on-call force for external ope-
rations, together with a possible pooling of appropriate national air mobile assets into a European 
rapid action force;" (1990); 
- "Establish in co-operation with the United Nations and especially with the relevant Gulf states, a 
WEU maritime presence in the Gulf area in accordance with Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty with as many member countries as possible contributing assets at least on an 
occasional basis, to help maintain peace and stability in the region and support diplomatic efforts 
directed towards the same ends;" (1991); 
- "Design a symbol of specific European identity to represent WEU and urge member countries to 
use it to distinguish their military forces - ships, aircraft, vehicles and personnel - taking part in 
WEU operations. Personnel serving in the planning cell should be among the first recipients of 
such a badge." (1992); 
- "Re-examine the respective tasks and roles of the United States and its European allies in the 
maintenance of peace and security on the European continent and take the appropriate measures 
to ensure that under no circumstances will it be possible for a security vacuum to develop for lack 
of appropriate preparation, co-operation and co-ordination;" (1993), 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Actively encourage member states to maintain and develop naval and maritime assets, co-ordina-
ting national capabilities in line with a defined WEU naval and maritime policy and ensuring compatibi-
lity with NATO's naval doctrine wherever possible; 
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2. Establish a working relationship on maritime matters with the European Commission's Directorate 
for Maritime Transport and develop links with appropriate international maritime agencies such as the 
International Maritime Organisation and the International Hydrographic Organisation as well as with 
maritime-orientated non-member countries in strategic areas; 
3. Consult the North Atlantic Council to review the abolition of the Channel Command so that the 
European dimension in the new NATO command structure is not neglected -establishing WEU liaison 
teams with NATO major and major subordinate commanders is a possible initial solution; 
4. Consider the expansion of the Channel Committee to include all WEU full and associate members 
from the Atlantic seaboard and also the establishment of a "Mediterranean Committee" to encompass all 
Mediterranean full and associate members; 
5. Give, via the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff Committee, the Heads of European Navies forum a for-
mal status and a specific mandate to contribute to the development of a WEU naval and maritime policy 
in conjunction with the Planning Cell; 
6. Staff the Planning Cell with adequate numbers and levels of naval personnel, including marines and 
representatives of the other maritime services as required to develop forthwith co-operation in the 
following areas: 
- joint task force planning; 
- command and control for naval operations (including naval intelligence gathering); 
- logistics (including transport by sea); 
- merchant ship construction and specialist requirements for both numbers and types of merchant 
ship as well as safeguards for recruiting and training appropriate crews; 
- policy for the effective employment of both naval and merchant marine reserves; 
- a coherent naval exercise policy and programme; 
7. Give priority to practical aspects of aero-maritime and amphibious co-operation such as the need to 
co-ordinate the operational availability of at least one carrier amongst appropriate member nations and to 
maintaining and furthering amphibious capabilities as a component part of a European rapid action force; 
8. Encourage the co-ordination of operations, using existing naval assets, especially in the Caribbean 
and notably with the United States authorities, to combat the drug trafficking which undermines European 
security; 
9. Seek to develop co-operation in the domain of naval procurement- hulls as well as systems-
through the Western European Armaments Group and emphasise the naval and maritime dimension of 
satellite observation when developing WED's Torrej6n Satellite Centre and the WEU Earth Observation 
Satellite programme; 
10. Create and award, in conjunction with national authorities, a WEU campaign medal to those who 
participate in operations under the aegis of WEU. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Sir Keith Speed, Rapporteur) 
I. WEU experience of naval 
and maritime co-operation 
1. Those who have been following develop-
ments in Western European Union during the last 
six years will have been struck by the fact that 
much of the co-operation has been naval- and 
maritime-based. Even before the "official end" of 
the cold war the focus of interest was shifting 
from the balance of forces on the central front 
which had occupied the attention of the previous 
generation. With the first WEU modified Brussels 
Treaty "Article Vill" operations during the Iran-
Iraq conflict a new era was born as the European 
allies began to recognise the possibilities for 
concerted action beyond traditional areas. 
2. An examination of a series of reports ema-
nating from the WEU Assembly's Defence 
Committee during the period bears witness to the 
evolution: 
- Naval aviation, Document 1139, 9th 
May 1988, Rapporteur: Mr. Wilkinson; 
- State of European security- intervention 
forces and reinforcement for the centre 
and the north, Document 1183, 26th 
Apri11989, Rapporteur: Mr. Speed; 
- Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: 
operations in the Gulf, Document 1243, 
20th October 1990, Rapporteur: Mr. De 
Hoop Scheffer; 
- Consequences of the invasion of Kuwait: 
continuing operations in the Gulf region, 
Document 1248, 7th November 1990, 
Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop Scheffer; 
- The Gulf crisis - lessons for Western 
European Union, Document 1268, 13th 
May 1991, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop 
Scheffer; 
- Operational arrangements for WEU- the 
Yugoslav crisis, Document 1294, 27th 
November 1991, Rapporteur: Mr. De 
Hoop Scheffer; 
- WEU: the operational organisation, 
Document 1307, 13th May 1992, 
Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith; 
- Application of United Nations 
Resolution 757, Document 1319, 2nd 
June 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. De Hoop 
Scheffer; 
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- WEU and the situation in former 
Yugoslavia, Document 1329, 3rd 
September 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Marten; 
- WED's operational organisation and the 
Yugoslav crisis, Document 1337, 5th 
November 1992, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Marten; 
- United Nations operations- interaction 
with WEU, Document 1366, 19th May 
1993, Rapporteur: Mrs. Baarveld-
Schlaman; 
- WEU initiatives on the Danube and in 
the Adriatic - reply to the thirty-eighth 
annual report of the Council, Document 
1367, 15th June 1993, Rapporteur: Mr. 
Marten; 
- Lessons drawn from the Yugoslav 
conflict, Document 1395, 9th November 
1993, Rapporteur: Sir Russell Johnston; 
- An operational organisation for WEU: 
naval co-operation - Part One: Adriatic 
operations, Document 1396, 9th 
November 1993, Co-Rapporteurs: Mr. 
Marten and Sir Keith Speed. 
3. The introduction to this last report read: 
"In the course of their fact-fmding in prepa-
ration for the presentation of the report on 
an operational organisation for WEU -
naval co-operation, your Rapporteurs have 
discovered such ramifications to the sub-
ject, with many more fundamental prin-
ciples at stake than were initially apparent, 
that they have decided to present the report 
in two parts rather than seek to postpone 
discussion to a future session. 
Certain aspects of the specific naval opera-
tions in the Adriatic require immediate 
attention and therefore this first part deals 
with the maritime task in hand. Part Two 
will deal with the wider issues involved and 
elaborate further on the structures and links 
required for the future conduct by WEU of 
naval operations in general." 
The present report is indeed the "Part Two" men-
tioned above but your Rapporteur has proposed 
the following title for it which more accurately 
preconises the content: an operational organisa-
tion for WEU: naval and maritime co-operation. 
4. The subject is of particular relevance of 
course at the moment, given operations under way 
and there has been much outside interest in what 
WEU is doing. Recently the current situation 
regarding WEU was admirably outlined in the 
remarks on "Naval co-operation in WEU" prepa-
red for delivery by the Secretary-General at the 
Greenwich Forum Twentieth Anniversary 
Conference at the Royal Naval College 
Greenwich on 9th February 1994: 
"In global geopolitics, the seas and oceans 
play a decisive role given that they cover 
71% of the world's surface. This explains 
the unique role of navies in crisis manage-
ment, monitoring maritime traffic and the 
environment, checking the implementation 
of the United Nations resolutions and even 
peace-keeping. 
Compared with armies and air forces, 
navies provide those states which have 
them with a considerable deterrent, attack 
and retaliation capability, which, in the case 
of the great powers, may extend to the enti-
re planet if they are able to provide a mini-
mum number of shore-based maintenance 
and support facilities. 
Whereas the end of the cold war may well 
bring a reduction in sea-based deterrent 
weapons (nuclear submarines equipped 
with inter-continental missiles), it is pro-
bable that greater attention will be paid to 
air maritime forces for these offer the most 
flexible and most effective means of inter-
vention in regional conflicts. This is one of 
the lessons to be drawn from the Gulf war. 
Not only has naval warfare become air- and 
sea-based, but by using aircraft from air-
craft carriers, it is possible to penetrate both 
land and sea areas which, centuries ago, 
represented almost entirely separate 
theatres of operation. 
That said, for the medium-sized powers 
and to some extent for the·major ones, the 
cut in military spending has made it impos-
sible to maintain both a modem and effecti-
ve coastal and ocean-going conventional 
fleet and the increasingly debatable major 
prestige programmes. No longer able to 
equip themselves with the full range of 
assets befitting a major maritime power, 
these countries are tending to integrate 
themselves into western strategic systems 
under American command in which they 
are no more than "subcontractors" offering 
on an ad hoc basis one or other particular 
key asset which less well-equipped coun-
tries do not possess. 
This development demonstrates the impor-
tance of strengthening European eo-opera-
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tion on defence. Taken individually, WEU 
member states no longer have the financial 
capability to acquire all the necessary 
assets for deterrence within the European 
continent or for force projection outside 
Europe. The urgent need for co-operation -
the only way of coping with the steady 
shrinkage in national defence budgets - is 
already apparent in the fields of space, stra-
tegic air and maritime transport, logistics 
outside Europe and telecommunications. 
There are three areas where WEU is fur-
thering co-operation with an impact on 
maritime defence and on successful mis-
sions already carried out by WEU maritime 
assets: 
- WEU maritime action in two Gulf 
wars; 
- the WEU/NATO operation in the 
Adriatic (Sharp Guard); 
- the WEU maritime operation plan 
for the use of maritime forces 
answerable to WEU (code named 
Combined Endeavour). 
Maritime action in two Gulf wars (1987-
1991) 
WEU has particular responsibilities under 
the modified Brussels Treaty for the 
defence of its member states' interests 
throughout the world. 
Article vm, paragraph 3 of the treaty does 
not restrict WEU's competence outside 
Europe: 
"At the request of any of the high 
contracting parties the Council shall 
be immediately convened in order to 
permit them to consult with regard to 
any situation which may constitute a 
threat to peace, in whatever area this 
threat should arise, or a danger to 
economic stability." 
There is no such thing as a "WEU area" 
although Article V guarantees a military 
response in the event of an "armed attack in 
Europe"; the term "out-of-Europe" is 
appropriate for WEU, since the term "out-
of-area" does not have the same meaning as 
when it is used in the context of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 
In 1987, the laying of mines in the Gulf 
waters as a result of the Iran-Iraq war, led 
WEU member states to react to the threat it 
posed to freedom of navigation. 
Italy and the Netherlands, followed by 
Belgium, decided therefore to contribute to 
strengthening the naval presence that 
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France and the United Kingdom were 
already providing in the region by dispat-
ching minesweepers. 
Operations ended with a mine-clearance 
action codenamed C1eansweep, which 
helped to complete clearance of a 300-mile 
sea lane from the Strait of Hormuz in 1988. 
European countries deployed most of the 
forces assigned to the protection of the sea 
lanes, a practical illustration of "burden-
sharing" that was fully appreciated by the 
United States. The experience gained from 
these activities in the Gulf strengthened 
Europe's potential for concerted action in 
the future. The undeniable success of the 
operations in the Gulf heightened 
Europeans' awareness of their capability 
for joint action. 
Three years later, Iraq's overnight invasion 
of Kuwait had the effect of throwing new 
light on the conceptual debate on the organ-
isation of European security and of putting 
to the test its member states' reaction capa-
bility and the organisation's operational 
potential on the basis of the reactivation 
and extension of the co-ordination mecha-
nisms approved by the WEU Nine during 
the first Gulf crisis. 
From the outset, the United States showed 
great interest in co-ordinating naval deploy-
ments in the Middle East in co-operation 
with WEU, the basis for which was the suc-
cess of the 1987-1988 WEU operations. 
Meeting in Paris on 21st August 1990, 
WEU Ministers decided to co-ordinate 
their operations in the area with the aim of 
implementing and enforcing Resolution 
661 of the United Nations Security 
Council, as well as any further measures 
the Security Council might adopt. 
Ministers emphasised that co-ordination 
within WEU should also facilitate co-ope-
ration with other countries' forces in the 
region, including those of the United 
States. 
The crisis was the occasion for offers of 
mutual support but, in the absence of a 
WEU staff headquarters, or an experienced 
planning unit, few practical decisions 
emerged. WEU's action evolved step by 
step, and the denouement of the crisis came 
too quickly to allow time to explore or put 
into practice a division of labour that might 
serve as the foundation for institutionalised 
multinational co-operation. The require-
ment for speed in reacting to events - a 
need highlighted by the Gulf crisis - is, 
however, a strong argument in favour of 
appropriate permanent structures. 
6 
The Gulf crisis provided a timely incentive 
for WEU member states to develop joint 
planning and consider establishing joint 
capabilities. With the pressure of dwindling 
defence budgets, a genuine division of 
labour among Europeans is the only way to 
combine greater effectiveness and interope-
rability with the economies of scale and 
cost made possible by standardisation. 
Sharp Guard 
A second major WEU maritime operation, 
stemming from a WEU initiative taken in 
the margins of the 1992 Helsinki CSCE 
meeting, was launched in July 1992: forces 
operating under WEU and NATO and 
working in strict co-ordination, began 
monitoring the compliance of resolutions 
of the United Nations Security Council 
against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic 
(Operations Maritime Monitor and Sharp 
Vigilance). On 22nd November 1992 both 
operations were amplified in scope to 
include the enforcement of relevant United 
Nations resolutions and became operations 
Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence. 
On 8th June 1993, the Councils of WEU 
and NATO met to approve a combined 
concept of operations for the implementa-
tion of Security Council Resolution 820. 
This agreement established a unified com-
mand under the codename Sharp Guard, 
over which the WEU and NATO Councils 
exert joint political control. Their guide-
lines are translated into military instruc-
tions through the appropriate bodies of the 
two organisations, co-operating within a 
joint ad hoc headquarters, MILCOM 
ADRIATIC. The concern for the effective-
ness and flexibility of procedures should 
reassure all those who complained of dupli-
cation between the alliance and its 
European pillar. 
The combined operation began on 15th 
June 1993 with the mission to conduct ope-
rations to monitor and enforce compliance 
with United Nations sanctions in accor-
dance with United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 713, 757, 
787 and 820. The overall operational 
control was delegated to an Italian 
Admiral, whose mission was to prevent all 
unauthorised shipping from entering the 
territorial waters of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro ). 
At present 12 nations are contributing 
forces: 19 vessels are participating and up 
to 12 000 sailors are at sea or on shore in 
the area. 
In practical terms the WEU naval element 
has been absorbed into the COMNAV-
SOUTH process for decision-making, pl~­
ning, etc., and there can be no quarrel with 
the result: an efficient, well-conducted 
embargo operation which to date ~as dealt 
with nearly 19 000 merchant marme ves-
sels. Since the United Nations Security 
Council strengthened the sanctions against 
Serbia and Montenegro with Resolution 
820 in April1993, no ship has been able to 
break the embargo. 
Special tribute should be paid to the indivi-
dual efforts of the particular officers concer-
ned with command of operations in the 
zone, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces 
Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Naval Forces 
Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH). 
Their patient pragmatism in working out 
command and control arrangements with the 
assistance of WEU officers is admirable. 
Combined Endeavour 
Because of their international commit-
ments and interests, WEU member states 
have maintained their conventional mari-
time forces at a level at which they are 
capable of operating in any sea in the world 
as needed. 
Most of the maritime forces of WEU 
nations are based in Europe and normally 
operate in the North Atlantic, the 
Mediterranean, the North Sea and the 
Baltic Sea. Some nations maintain standing 
forces in more distant locations including 
the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean and the 
Caribbean and/or regularly deploy forces 
worldwide. 
In the light of the evolution of the interna-
tional situation, the development of the 
European pillar of the alliance and to be 
able to deploy maritime forces suited to 
foreseeable needs, WEU member states 
have agreed to develop a maritime opera-
tion plan for the use of maritime forces ans-
werable to WEU that provides a mecha-
nism for generating and exercising WEU 
maritime forces on a mission-oriented basis, 
as stated in the Petersberg declaration. 
These countries may reach a common deci-
sion, based on the provisions of an appro-
priate framework, in particular Article '( of 
the modified Brussels Treaty or a Umted 
Nations or CSCE mandate, to pool some of 
their resources under WEU auspices in 
order to create multinational maritime 
forces, under the Council's authority, with 
diversified capabilities enabling them to 
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participate in the execution of new mis-
sions such as to: 
- carry out humanitarian and rescue 
missions; 
- take part in peace-keeping mis-
sions; 
- participate on a permanent basis in 
military crisis management, inclu-
ding peace-making operations, 
whilst maintaining their contribution to 
common defence at the appropriate level. 
The WEU Planning Cell, which was crea-
ted on 1st October 1992 and is under the 
Council's authority, has the task of prepa-
ring contingency plans for the employment 
of forces under WEU auspices, as well as 
recommendations for command, control 
and communication arrangements, includ-
ing standing operating procedures for the 
headquarters that might be selected. It will. 
also be the Planning Cell's responsibility to 
keep an updated list of units and combina-
tions of units which might be made avai-
lable to WEU for specific operations. 
The Planning Cell was tasked to examine 
the possibility of promoting forms of air-
maritime co-operation among WEU mem-
ber countries. The Planning Cell produced 
an operation plan to fulfil the ~~sterial 
mandate to promote European mantime co-
operation. 
Its aim is to organise the initial deployment 
of maritime forces and to identify maritime 
force packages for certain given tasks. 
Furthermore, it can also be used as the star-
ting mechanism for, and the initial phase of, 
any maritime exercise. 
In the spirit of the Petersberg declaration of 
19th June 1992, the objectives of the 
Combined Endeavour Plan are to: 
- evaluate predominantly maritime 
forces answerable to WEU which 
the organisation is capable of 
constituting in response to any mis-
sion it is assigned by the Council; 
- specify information procedures 
whereby the WEU Planning Cell 
can monitor the ability of WEU 
member states' armed forces to 
meet these needs; 
- specify where necessary the acti-
vation procedures and conditions 
for the use of these forces. 
The following maritime rOles derived from 
the mission areas described in the 
Petersberg declaration are being studied for 
WEU maritime forces: 
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(a) Humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief: this role includes 
missions conducted to relieve 
human suffering, including relief 
operations in response to natural 
and manmade disasters, search 
and rescue, and assistance in the 
management of refugees. 
(b) Conflict-prevention: which 
includes different maritime acti-
vities, in particular under 
Chapter VI of the United 
Nations Charter, ranging from 
diplomatic initiatives to preven-
tive deployment of maritime 
units intended to prevent dis-
putes from escalating into armed 
conflicts or from spreading. 
(c) Peace-making: consists of diplo-
matic actions conducted after the 
outbreak of conflict with the aim 
of establishing a peaceful settle-
ment. They can include such 
actions as diplomatic isolation and 
sanctions, which could be suppor-
ted by WEU maritime forces. 
(d) Peace-keeping: narrowly defi-
ned, is the containment, modera-
tion and/or termination of hosti-
lities between or within states, 
using international and impartial 
military forces and civilians to 
complement the political pro-
cess of conflict resolution and to 
restore and maintain peace. 
WEU maritime forces may be 
included within the military 
forces encompassed in this role. 
(e) Peace-enforcement: consists of 
action under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter using 
military means including mari-
time forces to restore peace in an 
area of conflict. It is in tasks 
under this role that WEU mari-
time forces will require war figh-
ting and limited power projec-
tion capabilities. 
(f) Peace-building: is post conflict 
action to identify and support 
structures which will tend to 
strengthen and solidify a political 
settlement in order to avoid a 
return to conflict. Maritime 
forces have various capabilities 
to support this role. 
Since WEU has no standing or on-call 
forces, the format of forces will be tailored to 
the needs of the current situation, and contri-
butions by member states will be on a volun-
8 
tary basis. The WEU Council will retain poli-
tical control over all WEU operations." 
5. The Secretary-General concludes: 
''This is only a beginning and a fairly limi-
ted one. However the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty is a new step in the evolu-
tion of WEU and the implementation of its 
work programme as stated by the Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Ministers of its member 
countries at Petersberg in June 1992. WEU 
offers the European Union a wide range of 
co-operative activities in the field of defen-
ce as well as a real operational potential. 
What comes next will largely depend on the 
political will of the European Union coun-
tries. Shortcomings only demonstrate one 
thing: the need to shorten the deadlines as 
much as possible in order to accelerate the 
rate at which a European defence is 
constructed. That need is particularly 
obvious and imperative in the field of mari-
time security, i.e. the protection of our 
shores and sea routes, all vital for the pros-
perity and survival of European societies." 
6. While agreeing with the Secretary-General 
in principle, your Rapporteur would argue that the 
WEU Council is taking too narrow a view of its 
responsibilities at present. Over the years WED's 
attributes have gradually been amputated - given 
away to other instances such as the Council of 
Europe or the then EEC. This may have been done 
from the best of motives but we have now reached 
the stage when it would appear that the Council is 
abandoning the concept of "security" which is 
going to European Union (and implicitly to the 
European Parliament) and is holding on (some-
what tenuously some would say) only to its "defen-
ce" remit under the modified Brussels Treaty. 
7. However, "security" and "defence" are 
inextricably linked - increasingly so, in fact, as 
our continent moves from the "black and white" 
relationship of the cold war era to the "greyness" 
of the risks and dangers we are now experiencing. 
8. National "defence" policies and pro-
grammes are intended to support what might be 
described as national "security" policies although 
the latter is usually a rather nebulous concept -
does a nation's foreign policy encompass its secu-
rity policy, or vice versa? 
9. In a recent article published in the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies publi-
cation "Survival", Sherard Cowper-Coles 
addresses the problem in the following terms: 
"Security is itself an elastic notion, whose 
meaning has been stretched in recent years 
to extend far beyond military security 
against aggression to include freedom from 
economic and environmental threats to the 
state. Security often comes to denote little 
more than its root meaning of "freedom 
from care" or generalised stability and 
well-being. Used in that broad sense, in 
which the distinction between overseas and 
security policy is all but invisible, the word 
is hardly a helpful tool for defence policy-
makers. 
The term "security policy" is also mislea-
ding. It implies a coherent subset of foreign 
policy, within which nestles defence policy, 
as one Russian doll within another. In fact, 
all overseas policies and programmes share 
the objectives. of promoting the security 
and prosperity of the United Kingdom and 
the stability of the international system to 
which it belongs. States maintain standing 
forces for the ultimate purpose of defen-
ding the state against external attack or 
internal subversion. But, in the absence of 
such immediate or obvious threats, armed 
forces are again what they always were: an 
important, perhaps the most important, sub-
set of the larger set of tools which states use 
to protect and promote their interests over-
seas. Many of those interests are only 
remotely related to war-fighting: promoting 
defence sales, countering drug-smuggling, 
conducting humanitarian operations, or 
goodwill exchanges of all kinds intended 
primarily to extend national influence." 
10. The arguments above cover the whole 
range of traditional forces - armies, navies and air 
forces - but increasingly also the para-military 
forces such as the gendarmerie and even (with 
reference to WEU operations on the Danube, for 
example) the customs and police services. 
11. WEU is already in the business of planning 
and carrying out operations which involve such 
varied agencies as those mentioned above. It is 
obvious therefore that professionals in these 
various fields should be appointed to augment the 
Planning Cell in Brussels when required. 
12. It is also obvious that WEU's present and 
future role includes a major maritime dimension 
and that Europe's security continues to depend to 
a large extent on Europe's maritime capabilities. 
Hence your Rapporteur's intention to highlight a 
number of different facets of the subject in the 
present report. 
II. General aspects of European naval and 
maritime co-operation 
13. Co-operation between naval forces, consis-
ting of ships, submarines and amphibious forces, 
and other maritime forces such as shore-based 
maritime air, has been very widespread in 
Western Europe for the last 50 years. 
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14. Provided there is political agreement, it is a 
straightforward matter for co-operation to be arran-
ged between naval forces in peacetime and for low-
intensity operations. At the very simplest level all 
users of the high seas expect to co-operate in such 
matters as search and rescue and other emergencies 
when the only requirement for co-operation to be 
established is some internationally-accepted means 
of communication, of which there are several. The 
passage exercise (Passex), in which forces of diffe-
rent navies meet for mutual training when their 
programmes take them through the same area, is a 
regular feature of most naval deployments. Indeed 
European navies have met for passage training 
since the earliest days of the Western Union in the 
late 1940s and early 1950s. To exercise together, 
naval forces need a common communications plan 
and some mutually understood procedures both of 
which can be as simple or as complicated as the 
exercise programme demands. • 
15. Western European navies almost invariably 
use NATO procedures which have continuously 
been developed and refined to be available for any 
situation. This vast body of doctrine is also fre-
quently used outside the Washington Treaty area. 
The United Kingdom, for example, has specific 
exercise agreements with some non-NATO 
nations, which involve the use of NATO proce-
dures. With Australia and New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, United States and Canada have 
a combined exercise agreement, and with 
Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand 
the United Kingdom has a five-power defence 
arrangement which is heavily influenced by the 
NATO way of doing business. France also has a 
spread of bilateral agreements worldwide and 
often uses standard NATO operating procedures. 
16. Just as it is easy for navies to meet for ad 
hoc exercises, it is a fairly simple matter for naval 
forces to co-operate at short notice for low-level 
military operations. Naval forces are inherently 
highly mobile, possess organic tactical logistics 
and the command and control of naval forces is 
flexible. On this last point it is a feature of all 
naval operations that units will change controlling 
authorities several times during an operation and 
the force packages for particular tasks are in a 
constant state of movement. 
17. It is not surprising, therefore, that the first 
military initiatives of the revitalised Western 
European Union involved co-operation between 
naval forces, first during the Iran-Iraq war and 
subsequently during the Gulf conflict as already 
mentioned. It also explains the ease and speed 
with which WEU managed to field a force for 
embargo operations in the Adriatic. A political 
decision was soon followed by forces in theatre 
without the need for the very detailed planning 
process required for the mounting, deployment 
and support of a ground operation. 
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18. It follows that naval forces can be used in 
an exemplary or experimental way in establishing 
or building military co-operation, especially 
during peacetime and for low-intensity opera-
tions. For high-intensity operations it is as impor-
tant for multinational maritime forces as for land-
air forces that formations contain a properly 
balanced range of integrated capabilities, that they 
are fully worked up and exercised and that they 
are controlled by practised staffs. The NATO 
experience has been that the major maritime for-
mations designed for high-intensity warfare such 
as the Atlantic Striking Fleet and Mediterranean 
Striking Force South have been predominantly 
United States formations to which other nations 
have contributed units and subordinate forma-
tions. The staffs for these multiple carrier battle 
forces have been United States national staffs 
augmented by personnel from other contributing 
NATO nations. While the new NATO reaction 
force concept recently adopted is designed to 
allow multinational maritime forces to be assem-
bled at short notice to meet a complete range of 
contingencies, for high-intensity combat these 
forces will still need to have as their core fully-
integrated and worked up balanced battlegroups 
predominantly drawn from a single nation and 
augmented by units and subordinate formations 
from other nations. Similarly, the command and 
staffs of these major formations are likely to be 
created by the augmentation of national staffs. 
19. During the recent Gulf operation a very 
large number of nations contributed maritime 
forces and many were under a WEU "flag". 
Nonetheless very few nations actually participa-
ted in the forward battle area where it was neces-
sary for maritime forces to be fully integrated. 
Only those nations equipped for and practised at 
full integration with United States naval forces 
were able to contribute where there was a require-
ment to carry out high-intensity tasks such as sea 
control and power projection. 
20. European naval forces have an important 
part to play in the range of tasks envisaged in the 
Petersberg declaration, as outlined in the 
Secretary-General's article for the Greenwich 
Forum meeting. Naval forces would be major 
contributors to humanitarian tasks, to operations 
in support of the peace process, and to crisis 
management generally. The ease with which mul-
tinational naval forces can be assembled, 
deployed and controlled makes them particularly 
useful in the early stages of crisis management 
and in any operation where the sea provides an 
avenue for access, naval forces will have a crucial 
role. The vast majority of European naval forces 
are assigned in principle to NATO and these 
forces would by and large also be available to 
WEU. In addition, the United Kingdom has decla-
red that one of the four star national joint head-
quarters, at Northwood, optimised for and expe-
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rienced at maritime operations, would be among 
those available to WEU. A two star United 
Kingdom national afloat joint force headquarters 
is also available for augmentation as a WEU 
afloat headquarters. 
21. As the Petersberg declaration makes clear, 
it is not WEU policy to create new permanent 
force structures separate from those of NATO. 
However a number of European nations partici-
pate in permanent bi- or multi-national European 
forces which are presently assigned to NATO but 
could be made available to WEU. The United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands have for many 
years operated a fully-integrated combined 
amphibious force which has at its core a brigade 
of British and Dutch marines. This force took part 
most successfully in Operation Haven, protecting 
the Kurds in Northern Iraq. All WEU member 
states are currently in the process of declaring 
naval forces which will be available to WEU. The 
WEU Planning Cell, in consultation with all 
WEU member states, has prepared a naval contin-
gency force generation plan (Combined 
Endeavour as mentioned above) together with 
proposals for exercises. 
22. The naval force generation plan is a useful 
first step and in principle should provide a basis 
for the smooth generation of WEU maritime 
forces from those declared by nations as available 
to WEU for the tasks envisaged under the 
Petersberg declaration. The plan should however 
be developed and make use of NATO doctrine and 
procedures wherever these are relevant and 
useable. Where WEU has specific requirements 
that differ from NATO, particularly in command 
and control of forces, the plan will probably need 
to develop special arrangements. The Planning 
Cell should also draw up specific mission-orienta-
ted plans for naval contingencies such as embargo 
operations or disengagement of forces. Some such 
plans already exist for current Adriatic operations 
but largely only on a national and unco-ordinated 
basis. 
23. An important aspect of European maritime 
co-operation is in training and exercising. A WEU 
exercise policy is currently being developed and 
is examined in a parallel report for the Assembly's 
Defence Committee, ''The WEU Planning Cell -
reply to the thirty-ninth annual report of the 
Council" (Rapporteur: Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman). 
Several European navies, notably Germany, the 
Netherlands and Portugal, use the United 
Kingdom's operational sea training facility. Other 
navies, notably Italy and Spain, use the French 
Fleet Training Centre in Toulon. The Belgian 
Navy hosts the Mine Warfare School at Ostend 
where all WEU navies are welcomed and where 
many joint tactics and procedures are developed. 
Similarly, several European navies take part in the 
United Kingdom Royal Navy/Royal Air Force 
joint maritime courses, which are conducted in 
the North Sea and North Atlantic under the direc-
tion of a joint staff at Pitreavie near Edinburgh in 
Scotland. These courses combine weapon training 
with high-intensity exercises in the open ocean. 
24. Initiatives for amphibious training have 
been particularly fruitful. The United Kingdom/ 
Netherlands landing force has a continuous pro-
gramme of training. United Kingdom Royal 
Marines exercise regularly in Portugal at the 
Santa Margherida ranges and have exercised with 
the regiment Fuzileiros. Exercises with a large 
amphibious component are run annually by 
France, Spain and Italy in turn. The Assembly's 
Defence Committee was invited to observe 
Exercise Farfadet in southern France in 1992, 
Ardente in northern Italy in 1993 and hopes to 
observe Tramontana in Spain later this year. 
These exercises are proving the model for the 
modern, more humanitarian and less threat-orien-
tated action which WEU is likely to be involved 
in over coming years. The majority of WEU 
nations took part in Ardente and will also be 
represented in the United Kingdom-sponsored 
Command Post Exercise Purple Nova at 
Northwood. The United Kingdom is now to exer-
cise amphibious helicopters on a regular basis 
with the French "Force d' Action Rapide" and 
Commachio Group of the United Kingdom Royal 
Marines, a specialist unit for the protection of off-
shore facilities, holds an annual exchange with 
French Marine Commandos - Exercise Scotch 
Wine. 
25. In terms of bilateral co-operation, neigh-
bouring maritime states are often to the fore, par-
ticularly over search and rescue, policing, etc. 
Joint exercises and joint operations have become 
the norm, although on occasion such develop-
ments have particular political overtones. 
26. France and Germany have begun a series of 
bilateral naval exercises alternating annually bet-
ween the Mediterranean and the Baltic. Germany 
and Poland have regular exchanges of units 
concentrating on search and rescue and your 
Rapporteur would suggest that this example 
should be followed not only between WEU 
nations and those naval members of the Forum of 
Consultation but also with existing and future 
WEU associate and observer countries. As men-
tioned previously, naval co-operation at whatever 
level is by far the easiest to organise and is proba-
bly the most effective. 
27. European maritime co-operation is fertile 
ground for development of the framework establi-
shed at Maastricht and Petersberg. While virtually 
all WEU nations possess naval forces (see 
Appendix I), the major contributors of naval 
forces to the security of Western Europe are 
France and the United Kingdom which are 
playing a full part in these developments. The 
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French and British navies have a long history of 
expeditionary operations and this experience is 
particularly useful in the present strategic envi-
ronment. Experience of the requirements of large-
scale and high-intensity maritime operations is of 
course the capacity which in the last resort under-
pins all effective crisis management and gives 
credibility to the diplomatic use of naval force. 
Hence the theme of the next chapter. 
Ill. A specific nucleus for European naval 
co-operation 
28. The two most complete navies in Europe 
belong to France and the United Kingdom and it 
is these two navies which therefore form a 
nucleus for European co-operation for the future. 
Both France and the United Kingdom possess the 
three core capabilities which together provide an 
attractive option for crisis response and risk 
management: amphibious ships, carriers and 
nuclear attack submarines. 
The three core capabilities 
29. A naval force's political attraction is the 
range of policy options it affords: it is a highly 
effective means of achieving the government's 
aims in the face of resistance. It is a versatile and 
politically flexible tool which is particularly 
effective at the outset of an operation and 
throughout its duration. 
30. A naval force can throw a long maritime 
punch, first by deploying as a symbol of resolve, 
then by controlling the sea, and finally by interve-
ning and supporting a land battle. But to achieve 
this, the naval force must be able to project leve-
rage or power. 
31. In this context amphibious ships have never 
been more relevant to the strategic and operatio-
nal environment. They offer a combination of 
strategic reach, logistic independence and opera-
tional mobility. Amphibious forces can sail early, 
and with orchestrated publicity, to demonstrate 
will and capability; or they can be despatched 
without demonstration if political understatement 
is required. They may take passage through inter-
national waters without infringement of territorial 
boundaries. They could poise at sea, raid or land 
on a potentially hostile coast at a time and place of 
the commander's choice and independent of shore 
infrastructure. Ashore, they can conduct indepen-
dent operations or create the preconditions for the 
landing or withdrawal of heavier forces. 
32. In 1993 the United Kingdom decided to 
contract for the design and construction of 
an assault carrier (in technical terms a landing 
platform helicopter - LPH). Such an LPH will be 
able to play a key role in future amphibious ope-
rations. It will be capable of putting ashore up to 
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800 marines in a single assault wave and, together 
with assault ships and landing ships logistic 
(LSLs), it will provide the British Royal Marines 
with the specialised shipping necessary to fulfil 
their role well into the next century. Complemen-
tary developments in the Netherlands will also 
ensure a continuing role for the United Kingdom/ 
Netherlands landing force. As it happens, the first 
major amphibious exercise to be conducted by the 
United Kingdom Royal Marines for seven years 
culminated in an assault on the island of Lewis in 
Scotland's Outer Hebrides in February 1994. 
Elements of 3 Commando Brigade, including 45 
Commando Group and supporting artillery and 
combat engineers, were joined by 1 Battalion 
Royal Netherlands Marine Corps and a company 
from the French Army's Force d' Action Rapide. 
For the first time four Griffon light air cushion 
vehicles were used to carry commandos ashore. 
Much experimentation has been carried out with 
hovercraft over the years but only now are they 
becoming fully operational. The Assembly's 
Defence Committee visited the USS Tortuga, a 
landing ship dock which carries such craft, in July 
1993 in Norfolk, VIrginia. 
33. Aircraft carriers are the second of the three 
core capabilities. They can provide a whole range 
of capabilities ranging from command and control 
to direct support of operations ashore, to anti-sur-
face and submarine warfare and air defence for an 
amphibious group, or on the sea lines of commu-
nication to an intervention area. Some believe that 
this could be done perfectly well by shore-based 
aircraft, but experience teaches differently: in 
three of the four high-intensity conflicts since 
1945 (Korea, Suez and the Falklands) the vast 
majority of all air support was carrier-based. The 
deployment and sustaining of aircraft in a theatre 
of operations, independent of host nation support, 
offers a considerable range of options to govern-
ment and is an excellent example of significant 
intervention capability. 
34. Last of the three core capabilities: nuclear 
attack submarines- SSNs. Capable of sustained 
high speed- they can cover 600 nautical miles per 
day with no need to refuel - they may be the first 
on the scene, where they are then available for 
insertion of special forces, for example, early 
denial of sea control or to procure critical intelli-
gence. They could also remain at sea, operating 
overtly or covertly and independently of outside 
support, for up to 90 days. 
35. The United States Navy's SSNs have the 
capability to launch cruise missiles: this was 
demonstrated to devastating effect during the Gulf 
conflict, and in the two subsequent raids against 
Iraq. Cruise missiles, 90% of which were fired 
from sea during the Gulf conflict, formed the first 
waves of attack at the outbreak of hostilities: they 
combined a surgical degree of accuracy with none 
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of the risk of aircrew losses which is associated 
with fixed wing operations. Possible procurement 
of submarine-launched cruise missiles has been 
studied by both France and the United Kingdom. 
36. In the spring of 1979 a window of opportu-
nity existed for a short period when the United 
Kingdom and France might have decided to deve-
lop a submarine-launched ballistic missile toge-
ther but then Britain was given the opportunity 
again of buying "off the American shelf' and the 
occasion passed by. 
37. Today with both countries engaged on 
divergent paths in terms of technology there 
is little chance of a common ballistic missile 
procurement programme in the foreseeable 
future. 
38. However, there is still room for some 
"common sense" co-operation: what is sometimes 
known as "water management". Through co-ordi-
nation of maintenance cycles, "time alongside", 
etc., both countries could ensure that their SSBN 
assets are employed to best advantage without any 
encroachment on the hitherto taboo subject of tar-
geting and all the implications. A parallel report 
from the Defence Committee -the role and future 
of nuclear weapons (Rapporteur: Mr. De Decker) 
- will be presented to the Assembly at the next 
plenary session. 
39. A maritime task force is ideally structured 
and equipped for joint operations. Almost any 
operation today is of a joint nature, and units 
which are able to contribute to the air, land and 
sea battle will have obvious merits. An amphi-
bious force has a clear joint capability, since it is 
designed to achieve local sea control, establish a 
bridgehead in order to create the conditions for 
the landing of heavier forces and then provide air 
support for friendly forces ashore. This capability 
is at the heart of the combined joint task force 
concept announced at the January 1994 NATO 
summit and which is currently being elaborated 
by NATO and WEU. 
40. In addition to the three core capabilities, 
some of which are shared by other European 
navies (notably Italy and Spain with the Garibaldi 
and Principe des Asturias carriers and the 
Netherlands with amphibious assets as mentioned 
above), the destroyers and frigates, mine-coun-
termeasure vessels and afloat support ships also 
play key roles. Destroyers and frigates are essen-
tial assets in any maritime conflict and are crucial 
to the sea denial task upon which all reinforce-
ment and amphibious operations depend. The 
Gulf conflict demonstrated the critical importance 
of a highly capable mine counter-measures force, 
and replenishment and logistic ships are obvious-
ly indispensable as both the Falklands and the 
Gulf conflicts demonstrated. Increasingly for the 
types of operation WEU may have to carry out in 
the future, an adequate European Merchant 
Marine is a vital asset- an important aspect which 
is addressed in Chapter V. 
IV. WEU navies and the United Nations 
41. In the wake of the end of East-West 
confrontation the international community is 
again looking to an expanded role for the United 
Nations in maintaining international peace and 
security and ameliorating human suffering. More 
United Nations peace-keeping operations have 
been authorised since 1988 than in the previous 
40 years, and the number of active United Nations 
operations has more than doubled since January 
1991. Moreover, the size and complexity of the 
operations have increased, and the scope of 
United Nations missions has expanded greatly. 
Recent events in former Yugoslavia and Somalia 
suggest that more - and more complex - opera-
tions are on the way. In short, the prominent glo-
bal security role that the founders imagined for 
the United Nations is about to be tested. 
42. Little international attention has been devo-
ted to United Nations naval co-operation issues. 
Most of the current proposals, in fact, fail to 
consider naval forces, except perhaps in connec-
tion with the need for sealift. Yet most of the 
United Nations operations recently authorised 
have naval components of some kind. Further, the 
areas where expansion of United Nations involve-
ment is possible, such as international enforce-
ment of United Nations agreements, are particu-
larly suited for a maritime context. 
Status of United Nations military co-operation 
43. Anticipating a resurgent role of the United 
Nations, the first United Nations Security Council 
Heads of State and Government summit in January 
1992 asked the Secretary-General to report on 
ways of "strengthening and making more efficient 
the capacity of the United Nations for preventive 
diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping". In 
his "An Agenda for Peace" submitted to the 
Security Council in June 1992, the Secretary-
General called for activation and strengthening of 
the provisions of the United Nations Charter to 
maintain or restore international peace and 
security. In particular, he called for preventive 
diplomacy to avoid the breakdown of peaceful 
conditions, mutually reinforcing efforts at peace-
keeping and peace-making when conflict breaks 
out, and post-conflict peace-building to prevent a 
recurrence of conflict by attacking its causes. 
United Nations naval missions and supporting 
tasks 
44. Only a handful of United Nations naval 
operations have taken place. As a result, most for-
mal and informal discussions of prospective 
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United Nations military action avoid consideration 
of naval missions, or missions performed by naval 
forces. United Nations naval mission areas and 
their supporting tasks could include: provide 
humanitarian assistance, intervene for humanita-
rian purposes, interdict sea and air traffic, conduct 
maritime peace-keeping, respond to aggression, 
control armaments/conduct demilitarisation, enfor-
ce maritime agreements, make a show of force, and 
protect sea and air traffic. The last three offer new 
areas for multinational naval co-operation in a 
United Nations context, whereas some United 
Nations precedent exists for the other missions. 
45. Removal of political constraints and the 
experience of the Gulf war have added greater elas-
ticity to plausible United Nations naval roles, 
though the arrangements for military effectiveness 
have not kept pace. The missions discussed above 
fall into all four areas for United Nations action 
identified in the Secretary-General's "An Agenda 
for Peace", though the focus is on those mission 
areas that involve some element of peace-keeping. 
The level of military force involved can range from 
zero (as in humanitarian assistance) to moderate (as 
in humanitarian intervention) to quite considerable 
(as in responding to aggression). Further, many 
prospective United Nations naval mission areas are 
not likely to be conducted with full local consent. 
Thus, they may require greater levels of force and 
entail possibly greater levels of risk to the forces 
than the majority of United Nations-sponsored 
operations in the past (excepting Korea, the Congo 
and the Gulf war). 
Organising options and analysis 
46. Possible options for organising multinatio-
nal naval co-operation in the United Nations 
context are plentiful. Four different options exist: 
- United Nations authorisation, as in the 
Gulf war; 
- United Nations designation, as in the 
Korean war; 
- United Nations direction of on-call 
national forces (as called for in the 
United Nations Charter and proposed by 
the Military Staff Committee in 1947) or 
peace-keeping units; and 
- for United Nations standing forces, as 
articulated in a 1918 proposal for a 
League of Nations Navy. 
47. These problems have been examined in two 
recent reports of the Assembly: United Nations 
operations - interaction with WEU, Document 
1366, 19th May 1993, Rapporteur: Mrs. 
Baarveld-Schlaman; Political relations between 
the United Nations and their consequences for the 
development of WEU, Document 1389, 8th 
November 1993, Rapporteur: Mr. Soell. 
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48. The naval aspects have been addressed in 
three recent studies which have all taken account 
of WEU's position: 
- "Multinational maritime forces: a break-
out from traditional peace-keeping?", 
Michael C. Pugh (Southampton Papers 
in International Policy - Mountbatten 
Centre for International Studies, 
University of Southampton); 
- "Blue Hulls: Multinational naval co-
operation and the United Nations", 
Jeffrey I. Sands (Center for Naval 
Analyses, Alexandria, VIrginia); 
- "The employment of maritime forces in 
support of United Nations resolutions" 
(Center for Naval Warfare Studies, 
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode 
Island). 
49. Suffice it to say that WEU has been in the 
van in implementing a whole range of operations 
which have been carried out more or less under 
United Nations auspices. Certain grey areas 
would need quite considerable clarification if they 
were to become the norm but the main lesson 
drawn has been the willingness not only of the 
WEU nations to become involved in such opera-
tions over past years but also for other countries, 
non-member nations, to seek to associate them-
selves with WEU activity either in the Gulf or in 
the Adriatic. 
50. Of course much of the good co-operation 
has resulted from a common usage of standard 
NATO procedures, although not where all coun-
tries are concerned. In addition, NATO itself has 
had to evolve quickly, especially, for example, in 
the realm of logistics. 
51. For example, NATO and WEU naval forces 
enforcing the United Nations blockade against 
Serbia are now being sustained by a new joint 
logistics system. A forward logistic site (FLS) 
was set up at the Italian Naval Air Station, 
Grottaglie, in December 1993 to streamline logis-
tic support for ships of the twelve allied navies 
participating in Operation Sharp Guard in the 
Adriatic Sea off the coast of former Yugoslavia. 
52. Previously, logistic support for military units 
taking part in NATO operations or exercises had 
been a national responsibility. The almost perma-
nent nature of the blockade in the Adriatic forced 
NATO and the participating countries to look at 
ways to streamline logistic support for the mission. 
53. The FLS co-ordinates all essential opera-
tional logistic requirements for Sharp Guard 
ships; arranges the delivery of mail, cargo and 
personnel to and from all ships taking part in the 
operation, and arranges for maintenance support 
at local harbours and medical evacuation of afloat 
personnel. 
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54. The FLS concept ensures the most efficient 
use of scarce helicopter assets. Each nation with a 
ship at sea would have to send its own helicopter 
ashore to collect or deliver priority items or per-
sonnel. With FLS co-ordination, either a shore-
based helicopter or one of the helicopters from 
any of the afloat ships can collect and deliver to 
any of the ships in the joint NATOIWEU task 
force. This ensures that the ships are not deprived 
of one of their essential operational assets for long 
periods of time on logistic tasks. 
55. This type of development is obviously very 
useful to all concerned and has a direct influence 
on United Nations capabilities. Again WEU must 
establish a working relationship with the appro-
priate United Nations authorities and ensure an 
efficient liaison. 
V. Maritime transport and European security 
56. For some years Europe has been going 
through a difficult period in terms of its economy 
and trade. The world recession is having a more 
devastating effect in Europe than in other parts of 
the world. Europe is working hard to address the 
challenges of today and tomorrow. The European 
Union is clearly trying to find an appropriate ans-
wer from within, by completing its internal mar-
ket as well as, in its relations with the rest of the 
world, by making sure that it does not become a 
Fortress Europe. 
57. The first answer of the twelve member 
states of the European Union to the structural 
problems characterising the European economies 
since the eighties has been the creation of the 
internal market which came formally into force on 
1st January 1993. With the ratification and the 
entering into force of the Treaty of Maastricht on 
1st November 1993, a further crucial milestone 
was reached on the way to European integration. 
On 1st January 1994, the European Economic 
Area, which creates close economic links between 
the European Union and six other West European 
countries, became reality. The economic potential 
of this production and consumer market of almost 
380 million people should certainly not be 
underestimated. 
58. In the last two decades the global economic 
and trade pattern has undergone drastic modifica-
tion. Most striking is the economic development 
of the Far East; some even speak about the Asian 
miracle. Traditional long-standing economic and 
trade structures have to be adapted to these 
changes in order to make sure that nations can 
remain active in world trade. 
59. As far as the external face of the European 
Union is concerned, Brussels played a decisive 
role in the successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
round. This will without any doubt lead to a revi-
val of foreign trade. Europe is not closing its eyes 
to economic integration processes taking place in 
other parts of the world. Traditional trade patterns 
will be influenced by the successful implementa-
tion of the NAFTA Agreement between the 
United States, Canada and Mexico, as well as by 
the concept of closer economic ties in the Pacific 
region with the creation of APEC (Asian Pacific 
Economic Co-operation) in which, at present, ele-
ven countries of the region participate. 
60. All these global developments and changes 
in world trade patterns will have direct or indirect 
effects on maritime transport. It is clear, for 
example, that maritime transport within as well as 
to and from the Far East in the largest sense of the 
word will grow progressively over the years and 
decades to come. The global view is important for 
a clear understanding of the maritime transport 
policy of the European Union. The added implica-
tion is that where Europe's merchant ships are 
present, Europe may have to deploy its warships 
to protect them. 
Role of maritime transport in the European 
Union 
61. Maritime transport has historically been of 
great economic, social, strategic and political 
importance for Europe. At present more than 90% 
of the Community's total external trade is carried 
out by maritime transport; less than 10% by all 
other modes of transport together. Of the total 
trade volume between the twelve member states 
of the European Union, almost 35% is taken by 
coastal or short sea shipping (SSS). These figures 
explain why the shipping industry of the 
Community has invested a total of 60 BECU (bil-
lion ECU) in mobile assets. 
62. Notwithstanding these figures, European 
shipping is going through difficult times. The per-
centage of the world's merchant fleet sailing 
under the flag of an EC member state has fallen 
from 45% in 1960 to 30% in 1980 and has since 
then further decreased to 13% at present. Flagging 
out is not just a problem for the European Union. 
Recent statistics show that no less than 45% of the 
world merchant fleet has flagged out. The fleet of 
the European Union, however, has been affected 
more than others as almost 55% of the total EC 
fleet is estimated to have flagged out and the 
curve is still rising rather than falling. One might 
say that it is not so much the flag that counts but 
much more the ownership of a vessel. A correct 
assumption, but here too one has to face the fact 
that the proportion of vessels owned or effective-
ly controlled by EC companies has fallen from 
36% in 1980 to less than 25% at present. A logical 
consequence of all this is that employment for 
European seafarers has decreased too. In 1992 
there were in total some 135 000 seafarers which 
is almost 60% less than in 1980. 
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63. The main reason for this decline is to a 
large extent to be found in the unfair or unequal 
competition our shipowners face from ships sai-
ling under cheap flags or open registers and, not 
least, from substandard ships where international-
ly agreed safety standards are not so strictly 
applied. Where European shipping is strong and is 
strengthening its efforts further, is in the quality of 
the vessels and services offered. 
The importance of the shipping industry 
64. Despite the recession in the West and the 
convulsive events in Eastern and Central Europe, 
world trade has burgeoned and will go on bur-
geoning, particularly in the context of the recent 
GATT agreement. 
65. As in the past, shipping will always be an 
international operation requiring international 
rules to direct its operations and requiring respon-
sible flag and port state enforcement to protect the 
marine environment, to ensure increasing stan-
dards of safety and to safeguard civilised crewing 
conditions. 
66. Merchant shipping is a significant 
European Union asset and critical in terms of the 
Union's overall transport policy. As a major inter-
national activity, Europe, in the largest trading 
block in the world, will ignore or fail to nourish 
this industry at its peril. 
67. Dependence on others to transport 
Europeans and their cargoes would be an extre-
mely dangerous situation for the 340 million 
people of the Union. A fleet is needed to serve 
those people. Europe needs to have a voice in 
international shipping affairs, to exemplify high 
standards of seafaring and safety and to show res-
pect for the maritime environment. Not least 
Europe needs an effective merchant fleet to sus-
tain its defence strategy as it is developed. 
European shipping policy 
68. Over the last decade the overriding purpose 
of the European Commission's shipping policy 
has been "to maintain and develop an efficient 
and competitive shipping industry and to secure 
competitive sea transport services in the interests 
of community trade". 
69. There has been a dramatic decline of the 
European fleet since 1980. The causes of that 
decline have been attributed to lower taxation, 
lower social security and lower wage costs which, 
together with a rather more permissive attitude 
about international regulations, have been the 
prime attractions of flagging out. There has been a 
serious reduction in employment of European 
Union seafarers and a general ageing of the fleet. 
The situation confronting virtually all European 
merchant fleets is urgent. 
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70. One of the issues which has bedeviled 
European shipping has been the increasingly 
geriatric nature of the fleets of the member states. 
Replacement is critical yet shipyard capacity is 
inadequate in order to cope with the problem. 
71. This problem in turn is compounded by the 
inadequate numbers of European trained crews, 
since inadequate training stands in direct propor-
tion to the use of more dubious registries by 
shipowners, where the emphasis lies in employing 
the cheapest crews with scant regard for safety, 
training or the maritime environment. It seems 
that only when a disaster occurs that, for a rela-
tively brief period, anxieties are raised, enquiries 
undertaken and promises of action given fairly 
freely, with the inevitably slow follow-up. 
72. What is particularly welcome about the 
approach of the European Commission has been 
its attempts to frame a strategy to stem the decline 
of the Union's maritime industries, as well as 
sharpening their competitive edge. What is further 
required now is an awareness of the defence and 
security aspects of European shipping. 
The interdependence of the maritime industries 
73. For far too long too many of the member 
states have allowed the various maritime indus-
tries to be dealt with in a somewhat insular way, 
failing or refusing to recognise their interdepen-
dence. The various industries have adopted their 
own individual defensive positions, often thereby 
hampering decisive action which could have been 
utilised to hone their international competitive-
ness. In turn this would have been of greater value 
to the wider economy. 
74. It must be evident that a growing European 
Union fleet would provide a more viable internal 
market for shipbuilding and repair yards as well 
as for suppliers of essential components. This is 
especially true of naval construction as well as in 
the civilian sector. 
75. Seldom has a country developed its mari-
time industries without relying on its national 
shipping sector as its main customer. Equally, 
European shipping needs to draw on a wide range 
of highly-skilled financial, insurance, legal and 
brokerage services and, working together, all these 
should constitute an asset with critical advantages 
for other land-based and port activities. 
76. Indifference - even hostility - towards the 
notion of dealing with the maritime industries in 
this way, has led directly to a reduction in compe-
titiveness of shipping and shipbuilding, not sim-
ply within the European Union but in the wider 
international field. 
Shipbuilding and competition policy 
77. There is a definite need for a viable 
European Union shipbuilding industry. A great 
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deal of restructuring has been undertaken over the 
last decade and a half. Substantial productivity 
gains and greater concentration of shipbuilding 
with a high technological content has taken place, 
yet European shipyards are still incapable of sur-
viving on the market without adequate public sup-
port and this is bound to continue until the main 
competitors, notably industries in the Pacific rim, 
dismantle their aid systems. 
78. A European approach should be based on 
stopping the fragmentation of European Union 
shipyards and ancillary activities and on looking 
for the economies of scale which are so attractive 
as far as Europe's Asian competitors are concer-
ned. It is therefore increasingly important to 
maximise co-operation between European Union 
undertakings, particularly in the field of research 
and development, design, purchasing, environ-
mental protection and marine engine manufac-
ture. This is particularly true of co-operation for 
naval procurement which must be developed 
beyond the realms of the Tripartite minehunter 
(even though one of its very successful forebears, 
the Ton-class minesweeper, was the result of early 
co-operation in the Western Union). Signs for 
optimism are perhaps valid with the Anglo-
French-Italian frigate project and Dutch-Spanish 
co-operation. Your Rapporteur hopes that before 
long the Western European Armaments Group 
will turn its attention to this domain. 
Defence 
79. Europe is more ambitious now about 
achieving a concerted defence policy than ever 
before. Yet this is certainly not a viable objective 
without adequate marine industries, merchant 
ships and those to crew them. Your Rapporteur 
has been given assurances by those responsible in 
the WEU Planning Cell that Europe has adequate 
shipping for essential defence purposes. The 
Greek Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Mr. Georgios Papandreou, has pointed 
out the advantages of the Greek merchant fleet 
becoming available for WEU operations with 
Greek membership of the organisation, but even 
so an urgent analysis of the current WEU assets, 
properly conducted and kept up to date, is vital 
before Europe enters into any conflict commit-
ment requiring considerable sea-borne logistic 
support. 
VI. Co-operation with the International 
Maritime Organisation and the International 
Hydographic Organisation 
80. WEU countries are members of two parti-
cular bodies with which WEU itself should consi-
der co-operating in certain domains impacting on 
European security: the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) and the International 
Hydographic Organisation (IHO). The work of 
the organisations is described below. 
(a) The International Maritime Organisation 
81. When the establishment of a specialised 
agency of the United Nations dealing with mari-
time affairs was first proposed, the main concern 
was to evolve international machinery to improve 
safety at sea. 
82. Because of the international nature of the 
shipping industry, it had long been recognised that 
action to improve safety in maritime operations 
would be more effective if carried out at an interna-
tional level rather than by individual countries 
acting unilaterally and without co-ordination with 
others. Although a number of important internatio-
nal agreements had already been adopted, many 
states believed that there was a need for a perma-
nent body which would be able to co-ordinate and 
promote further measures on a more regular basis. 
83. It was against this background that a confe-
rence held by the United Nations in 1948 adopted 
a convention establishing the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO) 1 as the first every 
body devoted exclusively to maritime matters. 
84. In the ten-year period between the adoption 
of the Convention and its entry into force in 1958, 
other problems related to safety but requiring 
slightly different emphasis had attracted interna-
tional attention. One of the most important of 
these was the threat of marine pollution from 
ships, particularly pollution by oil carried in tan-
kers. An international convention on this subject 
was actually adopted in 1954, four years before 
IMO came into existence, and responsibility for 
administering and promoting it was assumed by 
IMO in January 1959. From the very beginning, 
the improvement of maritime safety and the pre-
vention of marine pollution have been IMO's 
most important objectives. 
85. The organisation is based at 4 Albert 
Embankment, London, and is the only United 
Nations specialised agency to have its headquar-
ters in the United Kingdom. Its governing body is 
the Assembly, which meets once every two years. 
It consists of all137 member states and two asso-
ciate members. Between sessions of the Assembly 
a Council, consisting of 32 member governments 
elected by the Assembly, acts as IMO's governing 
body. 
The committees 
86. IMO is a technical organisation and most of 
its work is carried out in a number of committees 
and sub-committees. 
l. Until 1982 the organisation was called the Inter-
Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO). 
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87. The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) is 
the most senior of the committees that carry out 
the organisation's technical work. It has a number 
of sub-committees whose titles indicate the sub-
jects they deal with: safety of navigation; radio-
communications; life saving, search and rescue; 
training and watchkeeping; carriage of dangerous 
goods; ship design and equipment; fire protection; 
stability and load lines and fishing vessel safety; 
containers and cargoes; and bulk chemicals. 
88. The Marine Environment Protection 
Committee (MEPC) was established by the 
Assembly in November 1973. It is responsible for 
co-ordinating the organisation's activities in the 
prevention and control of pollution of the marine 
environment from ships. The Sub-Committee on 
Bulk Chemicals is also a sub-committee of the 
MEPC as far as pollution is concerned. 
89. The Legal Committee was originally estab-
lished to deal with the legal problems arising from 
the Torrey Canyon accident of 1967, but it was 
subsequently made a permanent committee. It is 
responsible for considering any legal matters 
within the scope of the organisation. 
90. The Technical Co-operation Committee is 
responsible for co-ordinating the work of the 
organisation in the provision of technical assis-
tance in the maritime field, in particular to the 
developing countries. The importance of techni-
cal assistance in IMO's work is shown by the fact 
that it is the first organisation in the United 
Nations system formally to recognise a Technical 
Co-operation Committee in its Convention. 
91. The Facilitation Committee is responsible 
for IMO's activities and functions relating to the 
facilitation of international maritime traffic. 
These are aimed at reducing the formalities and 
simplifying the documentation required of ships 
when entering or leaving ports or other terminals. 
92. All the committees of IMO are open to par-
ticipation by all member governments on an 
equal basis. 
The secretariat 
93. The secretariat is headed by the Secretary-
General, who is assisted by a staff of some 300 
international civil servants. The Secretary-
General is appointed by the Council, with the 
approval of the Assembly. 
94. In order to achieve its objectives, IMO has, 
in the last 30 years, promoted the adoption of 
some 30 conventions and protocols and adopted 
well over 700 codes and recommendations 
concerning maritime safety, the prevention of pol-
lution and related matters. The "related matters" 
include work on a number of subjects which come 
under the heading of "security" and are thus of 
interest to WEU navies. Piracy and armed rob-
bery at sea are increasing threats, as is drug traf-
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ficking (discussed in the explanatory memoran-
dum). The concerted action proposed should be 
carried out in full consultation with the IMO. 
Technical assistance 
95. While the adoption of conventions, codes 
and recommendations has in the past been IMO's 
most important function, in recent years the orga-
nisation has devoted increasing attention to secu-
ring the effective implementation of these mea-
sures throughout the world. 
96. As a result, the organisation's technical 
assistance activities have become more and more 
important and in 1977 IMO took steps to institu-
tionalise its Technical Co-operation Committee -
the first United Nations body to do so. 
97. The purpose of the technical assistance pro-
gramme is to help states, many of them develo-
ping countries, to ratify IMO conventions and to 
reach the standards contained in the SOLAS 
Convention and other instruments. As part of this 
programme, a number of advisers and consultants 
are employed by IMO - in the field as well as at 
headquarters - to give advice to governments on 
such matters as deck and engineering personnel 
and the prevention of pollution. 
98. Each year the organisation arranges or par-
ticipates in numerous seminars, workshops and 
other events which are designed to assist in the 
implementation of IMO measures. Some are held 
at IMO headquarters or in developed countries, 
others in the developing countries themselves. 
99. In the field of environmental protection 
IMO has actively co-operated with the Regional 
Seas Programme of the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) in the develop-
ment of regional anti-pollution arrangements. IMO 
is currently involved with programme develop-
ment in all of the eleven seas covered by UNEP 
action plans. A particularly interesting 
outcome of this co-operation is the Regional 
Marine Pollution Emergency Centre for the 
Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC) which was estab-
lished by IMO in conjunction with UNEP in 1976. 
lOO. But the most important subject of all is 
training. IMO measures can only be implemented 
effectively if those responsible are fully trained, 
and IMO has helped to develop or improve mariti-
me training academies in many countries around 
the world. Some of them cater purely for national 
needs. Others have been developed to deal with the 
requirements of a region - a very useful approach 
where the demand for trained personnel in indivi-
dual countries is not sufficient to justify the consi-
derable financial outlay needed to establish such 
institutions. IMO has also developed a series of 
model courses for use in training academies. 
101. While IMO supplies the expertise for these 
projects, the finance comes from various sources. 
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The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) is the most important of these, with other 
international bodies such as UNEP contributing in 
some cases. Individual countries also provide 
generous funds or help in other ways - for 
example, by providing training opportunities for 
cadets and other personnel from developing coun-
tries. This has enabled IMO to build up a success-
ful fellowship programme which, over the years, 
has helped to train many thousands of people. 
102. The most ambitious and exciting of all 
IMO's technical assistance projects is the World 
Maritime University at Malmo, Sweden, which 
opened in 1983. Its objective is to provide high-
level training facilities for personnel from develo-
ping countries who have already reached a relati-
vely high standard in their own countries but who 
would benefit from further intensive training. 
Many of those currently at the University have 
served as captains or chief engineers at sea and 
have moved into administrative positions ashore. 
Others are teachers at maritime academies, exam-
iners or surveyors, technical port managers, and 
so on. The University can train about 200 students 
at a time on two-year courses. The University is 
necessary because training of the specialised type 
provided at Malmo is not available in developing 
countries - or indeed anywhere else in the world. 
It has proved to be so successful that since 1985 a 
limited number of places have been made avail-
able to students from developed maritime nations. 
103. IMO works through a number of specialist 
committees and sub-committees. All these bodies 
are composed of representatives of member states 
who discharge their functions with the assistance 
and advice of appropriate bodies of the United 
Nations or the specialised agencies, as well as 
international governmental and non-governmen-
tal organisations with which formal relationships 
have been established. Formal arrangements for 
co-operation have been established with 33 inter-
governmental organisations, while 49 non-
governmental international organisations have 
been granted consultative status to participate in 
the work of various bodies in an observer capaci-
ty. If WEU is to engage fully in the realm of mari-
time co-operation, it must establish a working 
relationship with the IMO. 
(b) The International Hydro graphic Organisation 
104. The International Hydrographic Organi-
sation is another intergovernmental consultative 
and technical organisation. The object of the 
organisation is to bring about: 
(a) the co-ordination of the activities of 
national hydrographic offices; 
(b) the greatest possible uniformity in nau-
tical charts and documents; 
(c) the adoption of reliable and efficient 
methods of carrying out and exploiting 
hydrographic surveys; 
(d) the development of the sciences in the 
field of hydrography and the tech-
niques employed in descriptive ocean-
ography. 
105. Hydrography is the science of measuring 
and depicting those parameters necessary to des-
cribe the precise nature and configuration of the 
seabed, its geographical relationship to the land-
mass, and the characteristics and dynamics of the 
sea. These parameters include bathymetry, tides, 
currents, waves, physical properties of seawater, 
geology and geophysics. 
106. The primary use of the data collected is to 
compile marine charts and other graphic docu-
ments to facilitate and ensure safety of navigation 
for mariners in all the seas of the world, and for use 
by others concerned with the marine environment 
such as ocean engineers, oceanographers, marine 
biologists and environmental scientists. Among 
the most important applications of hydrographic 
knowledge is its use in the planning of exploration 
and exploitation of marine resources, the determi-
nation of seaward limits of national jurisdiction, 
and the delimitation of maritime boundaries. 
107. International co-operation in the field of 
hydrography began with a conference held in 
Washington in 1899 and two others in Saint 
Petersburg in 1908 and 1912. In 1919, 24 nations 
met in London for a Hydrographic Conference 
during which it was decided that a permanent 
body should be created. The resulting 
International Hydrographic Bureau began its acti-
vity in 1921 with 19 member states and with 
headquarters in the Principality of Monaco, to 
which the Bureau had been invited by H.S.H. 
Prince Albert I of Monaco. 
108. In 1970, an intergovernmental convention 
entered into force which changed the organisa-
tion's name and legal status, creating the 
International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO), 
with its headquarters (the IHB) permanently 
established in Monaco. The organisation current-
ly has a membership of 58 maritime states 
although a number of applications are pending. 
109. The official representative of each member 
government within the IHO is normally the natio-
nal Hydrographer, or Director of Hydrography, 
and these persons, together with their technical 
staff, meet at five-yearly intervals in Monaco for 
an International Hydrographic Conference. The 
conference reviews the progress achieved by the 
organisation and adopts the programmes to be 
pursued during the ensuing five-year period. A 
Directing Committee of three senior hydrogra-
phers is elected to guide the work of the Bureau 
during that time. 
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110. This Directing Committee, together with a 
small international staff of technical experts in 
hydrography and nautical cartography, co-ordi-
nates the technical programmes and provides 
advice and assistance to member states. All mem-
ber states have an equal. voice in arriving at agreed 
solutions to problems of standardisation and in 
programming the work of the Bureau, whilst any 
member may initiate new proposals for IHO 
consideration and adoption. Between conferences 
such matters are normally accomplished by cor-
respondence. 
111. The advent of the very large crude carrier 
with its exceptionally deep draught, the recogni-
tion of the need to protect the marine environ-
ment, the changing maritime trade patterns, the 
growing importance of seabed resources, and the 
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention affec-
ting areas of national jurisdiction have all served 
to highlight the inadequacies of the survey data 
available to produce the existing nautical charts 
and publications. Charts which served well just a 
few years ago now require recompilation to incor-
porate new data and these data must be gathered 
by hydrographic survey operations. The deficien-
cy is not limited to sparsely surveyed waters of 
developing nations, but also exists in the coastal 
waters of major industrial states. Fortunately, 
technology has advanced to a point where new 
instruments and techniques greatly facilitate the 
conduct of the precise and extensive surveys 
required. Further, co-operation among the various 
national charting agencies can serve to greatly 
enhance the effectiveness of chart production and 
navigational warning activities. 
112. The IHB has played a particular role 
during the Yugoslav crisis providing charts of 
special interest for WEU/NATO operations in 
the Adriatic in support of the United Nations 
embargo. 
VII. Navies and space 
113. Satellites are proving an increasingly 
important asset for naval forces - as well of 
course as posing a potential threat. 
114. In the first place the use of satellites for 
meteorological purposes has led to a considerable 
improvement in forecasting techniques - vital for 
naval operations, especially aeromaritime. The 
METEOSAT is probably the best-known system 
but oceanographic satellites such as Topex-
Poseidon (a Prance-United States venture) not 
only enhance standard weather forecasts, but are 
also opening new possibilities in the realm of anti-
submarine warfare (sound-propagation, determi-
nation of sonar techniques, etc.). Submarine 
detection possibilities are somewhat increased, 
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forcing submarines them~elves to beco.me more 
discreet but the seas are still far from bemg trans-
parent. 
115. Navigation satellite ne!wo_rks such. as 
Navstar together with commumcatwn satellites 
such as Skynet have also altered the pattern of 
command at sea. The political authority as well as 
the fleet commander has a much more complete 
and accurate idea of the tactical picture, with 
obvious implications for exercising strict control. 
116. Optical observation sa~ellite~ and. thos_e 
designed for gathe~g electromc or sig~al mtell~­
gence (Elint and SI~mt) are not ye~ specially opti-
mised for naval tactical uses but With the develop-
ment of the radar satellite and with increasing 
coverage and enhanced resolution spa~e is brin-
ging similar advantages to naval operations as on 
land. 
117. WEU's own Satellite Centre at Torrej6n 
has a particular potential role to play in develop-
ing many of the new capabi!ities which ':"~ll have 
an impact on naval operatiOns. In additiOn the 
procurement of the observation satellite syste~ 
currently envisaged as a result of the WEU feasi-
bility study should help enhance the scope for 
European action in the naval domain. 
VIII. WEU initiatives for maritime 
co-operation 
(a) Aero-maritime necessities 
118. At the origin the Franco-Spanish-Italian 
proposal of 7th September 1992 to ~onsti~t~ an 
aero-maritime force capable of fulfilling ffilSSions 
under the auspices of WEU was a comparativ~ly 
simple affair. The guiding principle was a desrre 
to co-ordinate aero-maritime forces so that a 
maximum number of assets between the three 
countries were available at any one time. 
119. With only two fixed wing carriers (France) 
and two short take-off and landing (STOL) car-
riers (one each to date for Italy and Spain) avai-
lable to WEU's three Mediterranean members it 
was obviously important to ensure that Ion~ m~­
tenance periods were staggered so that ship-avai-
lability was optimised. From that beginning it was 
a short step to the planning of what would amount 
to an on-call force to be constituted on an ad hoc 
basis for a given operation. 
120. The idea was germinating however just as 
France and Germany were on the throes of trying 
to work out the modalities for using the joint 
European Corps and were facing considerable cri-
ticism from the alliance before eventually 
agreeing a modus vivendi with SACEUR. 
121. In an effort to avoid similar sniping over 
the aero-maritime proposal, the idea was placed 
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very frrmly on the WEU "table" and led in part to 
the Combined Endeavour solution which has been 
examined above. It must be admitted however 
that Combined Endeavour is a somewhat anodyne 
solution - a palliative which does little to advance 
the original idea and lets those nations which have 
no intention of participating, for whatever 
motives, off the hook. 
122. While the proposal has been lo~g in ges~­
tion in a Planning Cell which many believe has Its 
power for initiative too circumscribed by too 
timid a Permanent Council, the world has moved 
on. Or rather, United States ideas on maritime 
strategy have had to shrink to match a reducing 
defence budget. This phenomenon and its poten-
tial effect on European imperatives has not been 
sufficiently taken into account in the WEU study. 
123. Secretary Aspin's 1993 "bottom-up 
review" stated that "the United States Navy will 
continue to patrol the Mediterranean Sea and 
other waters surrounding Europe". The disguised 
intention however was to accept long periods in 
which the United States Navy would not have a 
carrier in the Mediterranean at all. There would 
also be considerable cuts in the numbers of ships 
the United States would deploy in the 
Mediterranean, North Atlantic and European 
waters generally, and in the number and duration 
of exercises. 
124. The review did state that the United States 
would try to make up for gaps in carrier coverage 
by deploying either a "small" amphibious task 
force (including AV-8B Harriers, Cobra att~ck 
helicopters and a 200Q-strong Manne 
Expeditionary Brigade), or a task force based on a 
Tomahawk missile-equipped Aegis destroyer 
together with attack submarines and P-3 Orlon 
land-based maritime patrol aircraft. This was 
referred to in the review as the strategy of "adap-
tive joint force packages" for future maritime 
deployments. 
125. Immediately after the "bottom-up review" 
came the January 1994 NATO summit which 
recognised the legitimacy of the European de~en­
ce identity, seen by some as the start of a senous 
United States disengagement from Europe, or at 
best the return of the burden-sharing debate of the 
mid-1980s, seen by others as the point to begin 
flexing European muscles which had all but atro-
phied through lack of use ... 
126. For the countries which had originally pro-
posed the aero-maritime initiative the considera-
tion given it by WEU's Planning Cell is not the 
response expected. Italy is already now sugges-
ting a ground element to complement the naval 
and air components. The new idea has all the 
makings of the European rapid action force the 
Assembly has recommended for at least the last 
three years or indeed the "European standing 
naval force with organic naval aviation including 
air defence, airborne early warning, attack, anti-
submarine and heliborne assault assets for 
deployment under single command and unified 
control to areas outside the NATO theatre where 
Western Europ's security interests are at stake" 
(Naval aviation , Document 1139, submitted on 
behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr. 
Wilkinson, Rapporteur, on 9th May 1988). Later 
reports made specific recommendations on the 
European rapid action force (State of European 
security - intervention forces and reinforcement 
for the centre and the North, Document 1183, 26th 
April 1989, Rapporteur: Mr. Speed, and WEU: 
the operational organisation, Document 1307, 
13th May 1992, Rapporteur: Sir Dudley Smith). 
127. The French force d'action rapide became 
operational ten years ago, in 1984; Italy has very 
up-to-date experience of quick reaction for United 
Nations service in Mozambique and Somalia; 
Spain in the Gulf and Adriatic and is developing a 
rapid action capability which with that of its 
Mediterranean neighbours would probably be of 
greater use than making a fourth hand for the 
European corps in Strasbourg. In addition, it 
would be particularly disappointing if the United 
Kingdom, with its naval experience and its three 
STOL carriers, were not to be associated with the 
elaboration of these ideas. 
128. In passing, it is worthy of note that the 
French Defence Minister no less, Mr. Fran~ois 
Leotard, has recently wondered aloud whether it 
would not be a more attractive option to "create 
European intervention forces, commanded by a 
European General Staff and which would be both 
multinational and have integrated (air, land and 
sea) forces". Mr. Leotard was speaking in Paris on 
3rd March 1994 and linked the new plan to the 
existing one for the creation of an air and naval 
force made up of French, Spanish and Italian 
units. 
129. Your Rapporteur believes that it is only a 
matter of time before such a force becomes a rea-
lity and urges the WEU Permanent Council to 
charge the Planning Cell to examine more imagi-
native options as a matter of priority. 
(b) Countering drug trafficking 
130. While the European nations are slowly 
tackling the problem of drug trafficking, trying to 
prevent the plague hitting European shores, 
United States officials running the Pentagon's 
portion of the "drug war" are shifting their atten-
tion almost exclusively to combating cocaine at 
the source in Latin America, rather than trying to 
interdict the flow of illegal drugs across air and 
sea routes into the United States or towards 
Europe. The shift is due to a variety of factors, 
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including the relatively low volume of drugs sei-
zed in transit, United States budgetary constraints 
and a variety of organisational and force structure 
changes that emerged from the Pentagon's recent-
ly completed "bottom-up review". 
131. The Pentagon's counternarcotics office 
participated in a six-month government-wide 
counternarcotics policy review earlier this year 
and recently published a report detailing revisions 
to the Department. of Defense's counterdrug pro-
gramme. According to the review, although the 
United States military will continue to be invol-
ved in the detection and monitoring of the drug-
smuggling aircraft and boats in the so-called tran-
sit zones - areas between the borders of the 
narcotics source countries and those of the United 
States - the equipment currently deployed will be 
partially replaced by hardware that is less expen-
sive to operate and maintain. 
132. For example, instead of monitoring air 
traffic with United States Air Force E-3 airborne 
warning and control system (AWACS) and Navy 
E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft, 
the Pentagon will rely more on the relocatable 
over-the-horizon radar (ROTHR) system. 
ROTHR was originally developed by Raytheon 
for early detection of incoming Soviet bombers 
and ships, but was curtailed after the cold war 
ended. 
133. The 1988 Vienna Convention on the illicit 
traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-
stances requires police co-operation, and permits 
boarding and seizure outside territorial waters 
with prior permission of countries whose flag sus-
pected traffickers are flying (Articles 11 and 17). 
Enforcement will require co-operation between 
police, customs, coast guards and navies, with the 
latter particularly important for maritime and 
aerial surveillance. A host of maritime co-opera-
tion activities are now under way, including co-
operation among European states on maritime and 
aerial surveillance, co-operation between the 
United States, Britain, and occasionally others in 
the Caribbean, and several specific tailored cases 
of co-operation elsewhere involving military aid 
to civil ministries. 
134. This may well provide an opportunity for 
WEU itself to lend a hand to United States efforts. 
When the Defence Committee visited the United 
States in the summer of 1990 at the invitation of 
the then Secretary Cheney, your Rapporteur dis-
cussed European co-operation with the United 
States in the Caribbean. The idea would be to 
build on the assets which France, Britain and the 
Netherlands maintain in that part of the world: fri-
gates or corvettes based in the West Indies (some 
of which were instrumental in helping the United 
States apply the United Nations embargo on Haiti 
last year). The danger from drug trafficking is an 
obvious threat for European security and WEU 
DOCUMENT 1415 
with experience gained from its Danube opera-
tions would be well placed to take initiatives in 
this domain. 
135. Given reduced United States funding for 
national measures as described above, Washing-
ton's present administration would certainly wel-
come a WEU proposal to help co-ordinate a 
European effort in the Caribbean. In 1990 the res-
ponse was very warm from the Assistant 
Secretary for Defense responsible in the Pentagon 
for combating drug trafficking, but less so from 
the European side. Your Rapporteur has reason to 
believe that the climate for WEU co-ordination 
may well be changing and urges the Permanent 
Council to address the suggestion as a matter of 
urgency. 
IX. Command and control of WEU naval and 
maritime operations 
(a) A little history 
136. When the Brussels Treaty was signed in 
1948 and the Western Union came into being 
there was of course an operational dimension to 
the organisation which continued until NATO 
itself was given the operational side completely, 
in the mid-1950s. The original operations took the 
form of mainly naval exercises which helped the 
allied European navies maintain the co-operation 
which had been born during the rigours of the 
second world war. The Korean conflict also dis-
played a considerable maritime aspect. 
137. With the advent of NATO the Western 
Union command structures were superseded- the 
bulk of the forces stationed in Europe came from 
the United States and the two major commands 
created - Allied Command Europe and Allied 
Command Atlantic Ocean - were very firmly pla-
ced in the American orbit. 
138. There was a particular anomaly in this 
arrangement however in that the sea areas closest 
to Europe (the Channel and the southern North 
Sea) were left to the Europeans to command and 
organise. From the beginning the Western Union 
Chiefs of Staff had assumed responsibility for 
these sea areas, delegating authority to the respec-
tive Chiefs of Naval Service from Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
who formed the Channel Committee and created 
the Channel Command. 
139. The reasoning behind the various decisions 
taken then makes very interesting reading in the 
modern context. On 6th December 1950, the 
British Joint Planning Staff were reporting to the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee on "Naval/Air 
22 
Command in the Channel and southern North Sea 
area" in the following terms 2: 
''The sea areas of the Channel and southern 
North Sea under present plans, are not 
included in the area of responsibility of 
SHAPE or the Atlantic Ocean Command, 
but are the responsibility of the Western 
Union Chiefs of Staff. 
As a result of the decisions which have 
been taken to establish SHAPE and 
SACAO, the command in the Channel and 
Southern North Sea Area requires review to 
bring it under NATO control, since 
Holland, Belgium and France will no lon-
ger be able to represent their views through 
the Western Union Chiefs of Staff. 
In this connection the Dutch have recently 
raised the question of whether the United 
Kingdom to Holland convoys which are at 
present the joint responsibility of the 
United Kingdom/Dutch naval authorities, 
should not now come under the Standing 
Group since with the establishment of 
SHAPE this area is not under any NATO 
body. 
They have further suggested that, in order 
to effect this, the area should be included in 
theNAOR. 
In anticipation of instructions we have re-
examined the organisation of the Naval/Air 
Command in the Channel and southern 
North Sea area with a view to associating 
the area with NATO. Our report is at 
Annex, its conclusions are as follows: 
(a) The Channel and southern North 
Sea area should be a separate 
command area under NATO 
authority. 
(b) The British Chiefs of Staff should 
become the NATO authority res-
ponsible for the area, acting as 
agents of the Standing Group. 
(c) The British Chiefs of Staff should 
exercise control through the 
Naval Commander-in-Chief 
Home Station who would be the 
responsible naval authority, and 
through the Air Commander-in-
Chief Eastern Atlantic who 
would be the responsible air 
authority. 
(d) The views of the continental 
national authorities will be 
represented at Chiefs of Staff 
2. This and the following declassified document was kindly 
made available by the Chief of the SHAPE Historical Office. 
level through accredited repre-
sentatives who should be the 
Naval Attaches. At the level of 
Commander-in-Chief Home 
Station the views of the conti-
nental countries will be repre-
sented by an integrated staff of 
Dutch, Belgian and French offi-
cers. 
(e) The views of SHAPE will be 
represented at the Headquarters 
of Commander-in-Chief Home 
Station by a representative of 
FOWE appointed to the integra-
ted staff. 
(f) The Headquarters of Comman-
der-in-Chief Home Station should 
remain at Portsmouth where the 
Air Commander-in-Chief will be 
represented by a liaison staff. 
(g) The Command organisation for 
the Channel and southern North 
Sea area should be established in 
peacetime. 
(h) Some of the existing staff of the 
Naval Advisory Committee 
should be absorbed into the staff 
of the Commander-in-Chief 
Home Station for planning pur-
poses. 
The following appendices are attached: 
(a) Appendix A: diagram showing 
command structure with the 
British Chiefs-of-Staff respon-
sible for the Channel southern 
North Sea area acting as agents 
of the Standing Group. 
(b) Appendix B: map showing 
boundaries of the British Home 
Station command and Channel 
southern North Sea area. 
Recommendation 
We recommend that, if the Chiefs of Staff 
approve our report, they should forward it 
to the British representative on the Western 
European Regional Planning Group for use 
as a brief in discussions with the Dutch, 
Belgian and French authorities with a view 
to drawing up an agreed paper for presenta-
tion to the Standing Group." 
140. By 14th November 1951 decisions were 
ready but the Europeans were having to resist a 
United States ''takeover": 
"ProposalsforaNATO Channel Command 
The Channel and southern North Sea is an 
area which was originally covered by the 
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plans of the Western European Regional 
Planning Group. On the dissolution of the 
WERPG this area was not allocated either 
to the NAOR or to SHAPE and was not the-
refore within any NATO Command. Since 
the area is of vital importance to the 
European countries bordering it, these 
countries would not accept any command 
organisation for this area which did not 
give them representation in matters directly 
concerning this area. Hence the Channel 
Committee on which these nations would 
be represented was set up to act as agents of 
the Standing Group. 
A proposed Command organisation based 
largely on United Kingdom draft proposals 
was therefore submitted to the Standing 
Group by the Western Region Naval 
Advisory Committee. Except for minor 
amendments this proposed organisation has 
been incorporated in the Standing Group 
paper. All amendments have been discus-
sed fully and agreed to by the Chiefs of 
Staff. 
Terms of Reference for Allied Commander-
in-Chief Channel 
The Chiefs of Staff approved the draft 
terms of reference before they were consi-
dered by the Channel Committee who in 
turn approved and forwarded the report to 
the Standing Group. The final draft submit-
ted by the Standing Group to the Military 
Representatives met our requirements and 
was acceptable. 
Last minute amendments have, however, 
been submitted by the United States. Some 
of these are of a minor nature and have been 
included in the report. On the other hand the 
United States have also proposed two major 
amendments which, although not in the pre-
sent report, they will probably submit to the 
Military Committee. These are: 
(a) that SACLANT will as a matter 
of principle retain operational 
control of his forces when they 
enter the Channel area. 
(b) that Commander-in-Chief 
Channel should communicate 
direct with the Standing Group 
on operational matters. 
We are prepared to accept (b) if necessary 
but we think it unlikely that it will be 
accepted by the French and Dutch. 
We are not prepared to accept (a) above and 
consider that it should be strongly resisted 
since the Allied Commander-in-Chief 
Channel must have overriding authority in 
the Channel area." 
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(b) A particular paradox 
141. The Europeans achieved their aim in 1951 
and Allied Command Channel was duly estab-
lished (at first in Portsmouth, subsequently at 
Northwood, near London), with a British 
Commander-in-Chief on equal terms with the 
other two major NATO Commanders (MNC). The 
situation has continued from that day to this but 
the particular paradox is that the Channel 
Command is about to be abolished (at the end of 
June 1994!). 
142. This is taking place at the very moment that 
the European defence identity is recognised by 
NATO, and especially the United States, as legiti-
mate. The decision to downgrade the single 
European MNC was perhaps taken from the best 
of motives, in an attempt to save costs and ration-
alise NATO command structures. Nevertheless 
the effect is very unfortunate at best, if not deci-
dedly negative. 
143. The only plus factors in this saga are the 
decisions of the members of the Channel 
Committee not to abandon their independent role 
and to continue to meet and ensure the continuity 
of European interest in this important area. 
144. In addition the British Secretary of State for 
Defence has declared that the joint headquarters at 
Northwood (where Commander-in-Chief 
Channel is currently established) would be made 
available as an HQ for WEU operations if requi-
red. It is worth considering, as a matter of urgen-
cy, whether the Channel Command should not 
rather purely and simply revert to its original 
European dimension with Western European 
Union taking over a similar responsibility to that 
originally assumed by the Western Union. 
(c) WEU Maritime Headquarters 
145. The precedent for now proposing the estab-
lishment of a "WEU Element" at Northwood, to 
work alongside what will continue to be the 
NATO Eastern Atlantic Command, is of course 
the "WEU Element" already established with 
another NATO sub-command: CINCSOUTH/ 
COMNAVSOUTH in Naples. This latter organi-
sation has been very successful in running 
NATO/WEU operations in the Adriatic. It could 
perhaps be developed to form the nucleus of a 
"WEU Maritime Headquarters (Mediterranean)" 
in Naples to match the "WEU Maritime 
Headquarters (Atlantic/Channel)" at Northwood. 
146. The move would be logical in the sense of 
giving credence to the combined joint task force 
concept by providing a ready-made liaison ele-
ment in two important maritime regions. Similar 
arrangements could be envisaged for land and air 
headquarters. 
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147. Nations would provide staff on a regional 
basis also: French, British, German, Dutch, 
Portuguese and Belgian officers already serve on 
the Northwood staff, as do French, British, Italian, 
Spanish, German and Greek officers in Naples. 
Staff might be "double-batted" NATO/WEU to 
prevent duplication of numbers. 
148. Such regional headquarters would liaise 
closely with the WEU Planning Cell in Brussels 
and provide a much-needed operational link to 
ensure a more practical input into the Planning 
Cell's sometimes theoretical studies. NATO 
would also gain from the arrangement through the 
increased transparency with WEU which would 
result. It would also be of particular advantage for 
making the NATO infrastructure available for 
WEU, as decided at the January summit. 
149. If the WEU and North Atlantic Councils 
decide to pursue this idea they should do so with 
some alacrity. The Commander-in-Chief Channel 
will haul down his flag at Northwood on 30th 
June this year. With full analysis of the proposal 
and prompt decision-making it might even be pos-
sible to raise the WEU flag at Northwood before 
NATO's Commander-in-Chief Channel has put 
his own flag into a museum ... 
150. France's role is pivotal in these considera-
tions with a sea board on both the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean and a tradition of worldwide mari-
time presence. French goodwill and support for 
these ideas is essential if they are to be adopted 
and developed. French participation at the highest 
level recently in the Channel Committee and a 
lasting and robust commitment (much more so 
than other supposedly more "NATO-minded" 
nations) to United Nations and WEU operations 
augurs well. 
151. Another initiative for the WEU 
Mediterranean members would be for them to 
form a "Mediterranean Committee" along the 
lines of the present Channel Committee which 
would expand slightly to include Germany and 
perhaps Norway and Denmark. Ideally such 
committees would turn their attention to the wider 
maritime issues in their regions and in turn liaise 
with each other to build up the WEU-wide naval 
and maritime picture. 
(d) The Heads of European Navies 
152. In fact this latter body already exists, 
although in very informal fashion. For over five 
years now the Heads of European Navies have 
been meeting on a regular basis to "exchange 
ideas". Such a grouping has no "legal entity" at 
present and is not subject either to political gui-
dance or parliamentary control. For the future it 
could well be developed along the same lines as 
the WEU Chiefs of Defence Staff (CHODS) 
Committee which meets on a regular basis and 
especially prior to WEU Ministerial Council mee-
tings. 
153. It is to be hoped that once WEU policy has 
been agreed by ministers on a maritime issue ela-
borated in the Planning Cell, it is passed for 
implementation via the CHODS to the service res-
ponsible. Consultation between the single service 
chiefs on a WEU-wide basis is therefore to be 
encouraged and the Heads of European Navies 
forum might well be replicated by both WEU 
armies and air forces, just as the Heads of WEU 
Defence Procurement Organisations meet in the 
Western European Armaments Group. 
X. The way forward 
(a) Diologue with the Council 
154. While much of the tenor of the present 
report is designed to encourage the WEU 
Ministerial Council, the Permanent Council and 
the various instruments of WEU to take greater 
initiatives towards a reinforcing of co-operation 
in security and defence in Europe, it would be 
very remiss not to pay a particular tribute for what 
has already been achieved. In the six and a half 
years your Rapporteur has had the honour to be a 
member of the WEU Assembly, the organisation 
has undergone a step change in terms of both 
theory and practice, as well as in the development 
of an efficient pragmatism. 
155. Of course the member governments of 
WEU must take credit for giving their support and 
successive Chairmen-in-Office have given added 
impetus to progress over the past few years. But in 
addition the small number of individuals who 
serve the various instances of WEU - Assembly, 
Secretariat General, Planning Cell, Satellite 
Centre, Institute for Security Studies, WEAG 
Secretariat - do so with much "devotion to duty". 
Their small numbers - circa 100 until just 18 
months ago when, with the creation of the 
Planning Cell and the Satellite Centre, numbers of 
permanent staff doubled to 200- and the low bud-
get of the whole organisation bear witness to the 
cost efficiency of WEU in relation to most other 
international bodies. 
156. As essentially an intergovernmental organi-
sation WEU relies a great deal on those who come 
from national ministries to contribute to the 
various committees, although with the move to 
Brussels many are now beginning to serve in 
national permanent delegations. The uniformed 
services also are being exposed increasingly to 
WEU and what it stands for as they take part in 
operations under WEU auspices. 
157. In passing and in this context your 
Rapporteur should draw attention to the fact that 
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the Council has recently accepted the Assembly's 
proposal that those serving under the WEU flag 
(which now does exist, again thanks to the 
Assembly's prompting!) should wear a distingui-
shing badge. Thus, individuals on the Danube (in 
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania), in the Adriatic 
and in Naples wear the WEU insignia; ships in the 
Adriatic and patrol craft on the Danube fly the 
flag. It therefore would now be appropriate to take 
a further step: why not award a WEU "campaign 
medal" to all those (servicemen and women, poli-
ce, customs officials, etc.) who have served in 
WEU operations for a specific period? The 
Assembly has shown the way with the presenta-
tion of its medallion to Admirals Bonnot and 
Mariani for their conduct respectively of WEU 
operations in the Gulf and Adriatic. 
158. Just as the Council has seen fit to accept an 
increasing number of specific recommendations 
emanating from the Assembly over recent years, 
it has also now begun to heed requests for more 
detailed information both in the annual report and 
in replies to written questions. In particular the 
reporting on the various operations currently 
under way on the Danube and in the Adriatic has 
been explicit ( c.f. the answer to Written Question 
323 put by Mr. De Decker: 
Question: 
On 6th October 1993, the French weekly 
information letter, TTU, gave the following 
information: 
"Six Romanian barges transporting 
oil violated the international embar-
go on Serbia under the nose of WEU 
observers in Calafat (Romanian-
Serb frontier). 
Officially destined for the Romanian 
port of Tumu-Severin, 80 km up-
stream on the Danube, the barges 
transporting 4 415 tonnes of petrol 
and 1 334 tonnes of fuel oil were 
unloaded at the port of Prahovo, on 
the Serbian bank, near the Iron Gates 
lock. Similar violations had already 
occurred last January when barges 
from Ukraine repelled by Serb ves-
sels had unloaded at Prahovo". 
1. Can the Council confirm the truth of this 
violation of the embargo? Can it confirm 
the Romanian nationality of the barges? 
2. If so, why was the WEU unit on the 
Danube not able to prevent this violation? 
3. Why does the Council continue to refu-
se to publish the list of violations noted on 
the Danube and in the Adriatic whereas, in 
the absence of coercive means, such publi-
cation would be the only democratic means 
of pressure to deter these violations? 
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Answer: 
1. The Council did indeed receive 
information to the effect that a convoy of 
six barges which, in early September, were 
heading for the Romanian port of Turnu-
Severin, did not arrive at their destination. 
This was a Romanian convoy known as 
Giurgiu 18 belonging to the Navrom com-
pany. 
2. The WEU Danube mission is carried 
out on the basis of memoranda of under-
standing concluded between WEU and 
each of the three riparian states concerned. 
The memoranda are based on the relevant 
resolutions of the United Nations Security 
Council. They set out the mandate for the 
mission and the tasks needed to accomplish 
it. The memoranda are substantially the 
same, the one concluded with Romania 
being the most significant as regards the 
incident referred to by the reference ques-
tion. It contains the following stipulations: 
"Article 1 
3. ( ... ) In fulfilling their tasks, WEU 
personnel will act under the general 
authority of Romania, which has the 
main responsibility for ensuring 
strict implementation of the relevant 
United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions, and on a basis of mutual 
agreement. 
4. The support given to Romania by 
WEU member states will consist of 
patrol boats, appropriate personnel 
and the necessary equipment( ... ). 
Article m 
3. A control area will be established 
on the territory of Romania at 
Calafat, and an additional checking 
point will be established in Galati 
( ... )". 
The memorandum indicates that 
WEU is providing technical assistan-
ce to Romania in the form of person-
nel and equipment and that its mis-
sion is being carried out on the 
Danube downstream of Calafat. The 
checks carried out are designed to 
deter and, if necessary, to detect or 
even thwart any attempt at violation 
on this section of the Danube. On 
the section upstream of Calafat, 
which is much shorter than the 
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downstream section, there is a cer-
tain amount of cabotage traffic. 
WEU has no authority over this traf-
fic since it is not covered by the rele-
vant resolutions." 
3. Only the United Nations is compe-
tent to publish information on the violation 
of an embargo imposed on the basis of 
United Nations resolutions. 
159. Your Rapporteur's previous report, prepa-
red jointly with Mr. Giinter Marten, on "An ope-
rational organisation for WEU: naval co-opera-
tion- Part One: Adriatic Operations", prompted a 
positive and reasonably rapid response from the 
Council. The following comments in particular 
are germane: 
"1. At the meeting of the Council of 
Ministers in Luxembourg on 22nd 
November 1993, Ministers agreed that the 
relevant statements in Part I of their declara-
tion were intended as a European contribu-
tion to the alliance summit. The NATO 
summit gave its full support to the develop-
ment of the European security and defence 
identity which, as envisaged in the 
Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term pers-
pective of a common defence policy within 
the European Union, might in time lead to a 
common defence, compatible with that of 
the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly, the 
European allies will take greater responsibi-
lity for their common security and defence. 
2. The NATO summit made clear that 
the Sixteen stood ready to make collective 
assets of the alliance available to WEU, on 
the basis of consultations in the North 
Atlantic Council, for operations undertaken 
by the European allies within the frame-
work of joint actions under the common 
foreign and security policy of the European 
Union. Better European co-ordination and 
planning will strengthen the European 
pillar and the alliance itself. 
Translated into military terms, this will 
mean in particular the setting-up of combi-
ned joint task forces (CJTF) able to serve 
under both WEU and NATO commands for 
specific peace-keeping operations for 
example, including operations with coun-
tries outside the alliance such as the coun-
tries of the WEU Forum of Consultation or 
the countries signatory to the partnership 
for peace. 
The WEU Council is considering the prac-
tical arrangements for the use of these com-
bined joint task forces as part of its own 
operations, and also the procedure under 
which they might be made available. 
3. An appropriate working budget for 
the two WEU staff elements working with 
COMNAVSOUTH staff in Naples and for 
the COMWEUMARFOR in the Adriatic is 
under consideration. 
5. The Council confirms that WEU 
member states support the Adriatic opera-
tions with all the means at their disposal. 
The Council pursues an active public infor-
mation policy to ensure the transparency of 
the combined NATO and WEU operations, 
thereby contributing to a better understan-
ding ofWEU's action. 
7. The Council has placed on its agenda 
consideration of the possibility of using the 
naval assets of the member states of the 
WEU Forum of Consultation as part of the 
operations in the Adriatic. Such participa-
tion is to be seen in the context of the 
enhanced status which the Council plans to 
propose to the consultation partners. Co-
operation of this kind between WEU and its 
consultation partners is among the mea-
sures currently being studied as part of the 
work on the enhanced status, soon to be 
proposed to the consultation partner coun-
tries." 
160. In addition the Council paid tribute to the 
men and women involved in the Adriatic opera-
tions and joined the President of the Assembly in 
sending a Christmas message to express "great 
appreciation to WEU personnel engaged in the 
Danube and Sharp Guard operations for their 
dedication and achievement". 
161. Elsewhere the Council responded quickly 
to the President of the Assembly's message rela-
ting to the first official ship visit by the WEU 
Flotilla and the need to maintain WEU assets: 
"The President of the Western European 
Union Assembly, Sir Dudley Smith, MP, 
welcomed the news of a first official visit 
by WEU's Contingency Maritime Force to 
Taranto from 5th to 9th March. 
The three frigates: Zeffrro (Italy), Cassard 
(France) and Cataluna (Spain), are partici-
pating in the embargo operations in the 
Adriatic, flying the WEU flag. The WEU 
force comprises five ships at present, under 
the command of Rear Admiral Bolongaro 
(Italy) and is fully integrated into the com-
bined NATOIWEU Operation Sharp Guard 
which was established in the Adriatic on 
14th June 1993. 
The three frigates rejoined the operational 
zone on 1Oth March. 
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The President of the Assembly expressed 
the hope that the WEU Permanent Council 
and member governments would ensure 
that the necessary material and human 
resources are made available to maintain 
the effectiveness of the Adriatic opera-
tions." 
162. The Council has "charged WEU military 
delegates with monitoring the rotation of WEU 
personnel"; your Rapporteur trusts that given the 
recommendations expressed elsewhere that such 
monitoring will prove effective. The use of the 
military delegates as a WEU "military commit-
tee" is a welcome initiative as is the news in the 
annual report that the rules of engagement for 
Adriatic operations have been approved jointly 
with the NATO Council. 
163. The beginning of a relationship with 
European Union is also evident in the annual 
report, especially with regard to the situation in 
former Yugoslavia: 
"The Belgian Representative, on behalf of 
the Presidency of the Twelve, regularly 
briefed the Permanent Council on the activi-
ties and demarches of the European 
Community aimed at reaching a peaceful 
solution to the conflict in former Yugoslavia 
The Permanent Council has closely moni-
tored developments on the ground, its dis-
cussions focusing on the implementation of 
the Danube embargo, participation of naval 
forces of WEU member states in the 
Adriatic embargo, and the possible invol-
vement of WEU in the EC's administration 
of the Mostar district. The activities of the 
Experts' Groups and the Mostar Working 
Group, in co-operation with the Planning 
Cell, dealt mainly with this possibility. 
The Presidency has regularly briefed the 
Council on developments in the WEU 
Danube operation. The Council has for 
example discussed the various measures 
taken to ensure effective co-ordination bet-
ween the WEU and SAM teams and it has 
also discussed the funding of the opera-
tions. These discussions have enabled the 
Council to gauge problems which may 
recur in similar operations. The Presidency 
has regularly taken part in the Vienna mee-
tings of the Sanctions Liaison Group." 
164. Much remains to be done however, ideally 
along the lines detailed throughout the present 
report and in the draft recommendations. 
(b) Relations with the wider world 
165. Your Rapporteur has urged a variety of 
wider contacts and co-operation in the naval and 
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maritime domain in an effort to improve WEU's 
operational organisation. 
166. Suggestions range from co-operation with 
the United Nations's burgeoning military organi-
sation and United Nations maritime subdivisions 
in particular through to naval links with those 
maritime nations amongst the WEU Forum of 
Consultation member countries. In addition, the 
naval and maritime assets of some of the new 
members of the European Union are not negli-
gible. 
167. Last but not least your Rapporteur would 
like to highlight six countries with which WEU 
would be wise to establish relations in the near to 
mid-term. 
168. In the Mediterranean Malta and Cyprus 
represent not only a traditional interest strategi-
cally but also specific maritime advantages. Both 
countries are developing special links with 
European Union and may well soon be in a posi-
tion to request a statute vis-a-vis WEU. Malta 
hosts the United Nations's Law of the Sea 
Institute which is taking students from all over the 
world. Malta also possesses an excellent infra-
structure of naval facilities hard to match in the 
Mediterranean area which are somewhat under-
utilised. Cyprus is developing the use of its flag 
for a growing merchant marine which has already 
proved invaluable for replenishment operations 
during the Gulf conflict. 
169. Amongst the states of the southern hemis-
phere both Argentina and Australia have shown a 
particular willingness to co-operate in a wider 
naval arena and both countries took part alongside 
WEU in embargo operations in the Gulf or Red 
Sea in 1991/92. Both are strategically placed in 
their respective parts of the world as is South 
Africa between the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. 
The Simonstown naval base has had a particular 
importance in days gone by and might well have 
again in the future. South Africa's new demo-
cracy will allow a greater participation on the 
international maritime scene. The growing impor-
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tance of the Cape route heralds a much-needed 
development of the Naval Control of Shipping 
Organisation which was designed originally by 
the western allies to monitor and control merchant 
marine routes and convoys and whose representa-
tives South Africa has continued to host over the 
years. 
170. In the Pacific, Japan's naval and maritime 
assets are developing considerably. Japan (as well 
as Germany, of course) sent mine-hunting vessels 
out of traditional areas to co-operate with WEU in 
mine-sweeping operations in the Gulf at the end 
of the conflict in 1991/92. 
171. Overall there is no escaping the fact which 
permeates the whole of the present report: naval 
and maritime co-operation is generally much 
easier than any other. WEU nations individually 
and the organisation as a whole should be ready to 
co-operate whenever possible with all states 
which seek naval and/or maritime links: it is very 
difficult to predict when such links may prove 
vital for future WEU operations. Europe's naval 
and maritime interests are worldwide- WEU's 
should be also, with a naval and maritime opera-
tional structure to match. 
172. Your Rapporteur has tried to demonstrate in 
the present report that WEU naval and maritime 
operational co-operation is already "alive and 
well" but that there is room for improvement and 
greater efficiency. A number of recommendations 
are designed to widen the naval and maritime 
remit of WEU in general and the Planning Cell in 
particular. Without a coherent strategy for naval 
and maritime affairs WEU is likely to be slow to 
react, either as the European pillar of NATO or as 
the operational arm of European Union. Recent 
history has proved the efficacy of action at sea in 
a series of conflicts where WEU has been very 
much to the fore. Let us ensure that our operatio-
nal organisation is properly equipped and ready to 
meet similar naval and maritime challenges in the 
future. 
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B 
Total armed forces 80700 
Navy 4400 
Submarines 
3FF 
Principal surface 
combatants 
Patrol and coastal 
combatants 
Mine warfare vessels 13 
Amphibious 
Support and miscellaneous 3 
B 
F 
D 
I 
NL 
p 
E 
UK 
SS1 
SSBN 
SSN 
CV 
Naval air arm/ 
Maritime air 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
-
5 hel 
submarine(s) (tactical) 
nuclear-fuelled ballistic-missile 
submarine(s) 
nuclear-fuelled submarine(s) 
(tactical) 
aircraft carrier( s) 
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Composition of WEU navies 
F D 
411600 287 000 
65 400 31200 
19 20SS1 
(5 SSBN 
6SSN 
8 SS1) 
42 14 
(2CV (6DD 
1 cc 8FF) 
4DD 
35FF) 
25 38 
21 41 
3LPD 11 LCU 
1 LSD ILCM 
5LSM 
34LCM 
8LCT 
37 40 
107 ac 115 ac 
40hel 19 hel 
Key 
I 
344 600 
43 600 
8 SS1 
28 
(1 CV 
1 cc 
4DD 
22FF) 
18 
12 
2LPD 
3LCU 
3LCM 
42 
2ac 
89hel 
cc 
DD 
FF 
ac 
hel 
LCA 
LCU 
LCM 
LSD 
LPD 
LSM 
LST 
LCT 
NL 
74600 
14900 
5 SS1 
17 
(4DD 
13 FF 
21 
12LCA 
13 
13 ac 
22hel 
cruiser(s) 
destroyer( s) 
frigate(s) 
combat aircraft 
helicopter( s) 
p 
50700 
12500 
3 SS1 
11FF 
30 
3LCU 
13LCM 
8 
-
2hel 
landing craft, assault 
landing craft, utility 
landing craft, mechanised 
landing ship, dock 
landing platform, dock 
landing ship, medium 
landing ship, tank 
landing craft, tank 
Source: IISS Military Balance 1993-94 (modified and updated) 
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E UK 
200700 274 800 
32000 59 300 
8 SS1 18 
(3 SSBN 
13SSN 
2SS1) 
16 40 
(1 CV (3CV 
15FF) 12DD 
25 FF) 
28 26 
12 30 
2LST 2LPD 
3LCT 5LST 
2LCU 19LCU 
8LCM 
28 32 
21 ac 42ac 
28 hel 153 hel 
DOCUMENT 1415 APPENDIX IT 
APPENDIXll 
WEU/NATO Operation Sharp Guard 
Mission 
To conduct operations to monitor and 
enforce compliance with United Nations sanc-
tions in accordance with United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 713,757 787 and 
820. Combined Task Force 440, in partic~lar, pre-
ven~s al~ unauthorised shipping from entering the 
terntonal waters of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
Achievements 
During Operation Sharp Guard, over 
19 000 merchant vessels have been challenged. 
Of them~ over 1 850 have been halted and inspec-
ted, or diverted to a port for inspection. As a result 
of the co-ordinated efforts of the forces which 
have operated under NATO and WEU, 1 032 mer-
chant vessels were halted and boarded- or diver-
ted to a port for inspection- from 22nd November 
1992 to 15th June 1993, when Operation Sharp 
Guard began. During the same period 12 367 mer-
chant vessels were challenged. Therefore, an 
overall total of over 31 000 ships have been chal-
lenged so far, with over 3 000 inspected or diver-
ted. These results have been possible thanks to 
over 5 400 ship days spent at sea, over 3 500 sor-
ties by MPA aircraft and over 2 500 sorties by 
NATO airborne early warning aircraft. 
After the United Nations Security Council 
strengthened the embargo against Serbia and 
Montenegro with Resolution 820 in April 1993 
no ship has been able to break the embargo. ' 
History 
In July 1992, forces operating under NATO 
and ~.u, ~or king in. s~ct co-ordination, began 
moruto~g m the Adriatic Sea the compliance of 
resolu.twns. of the United Nations Security 
Cou~~ll agam~t former Yugoslavia (Operations 
Man time Morutor and Sharp Vigilance). On 22nd 
November 1992 both operations were amplified 
in scope to include the enforcement of relevant 
United Nations resolutions (Operations Maritime 
Guard and Sharp Fence). 
On 8th June 1993 the Councils of NATO 
and WEU, at a joint session, reviewed the embar-
go opera~ons and app~oved a combined concept 
of operatiOns for the Implementation of United 
Nations Resolution 820, which strengthened the 
existing en;tbargos a~ainst the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This 
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concept included a single command and control 
arrangement for the combined Operation Sharp 
Guard under the authority of the Councils of both 
organisations. The operation began on 15th June 
1993. 
Nations contributing forces 
Nations contributing forces at the moment 
are: Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Ne~erla~ds, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
Uruted Kingdom, United States. 
Organisation 
The overall operational control is delegated 
to General Mario. Angeli, Italian Navy, as 
Commander, Combmed Task Force 440 (CCTF 
440). He is assisted by Rear Admiral Gianfranco 
Coviello, Italian Navy, as Deputy CCTF 440. 
Admiral Angeli is the Commander of Allied 
Naval Forces Southern Europe. As CCTF 440, his 
staff has been complemented by a WEU staff 
element. 
Surface ships operate under two operatio-
nal combined task groups (CTG) at sea to conduct 
operations ~ ~e Adria~c Sea. A third task group 
has resp?nsibility for ships conducting training or 
port VISits. Operational responsibilities rotate 
among the task group commanders. Currently, the 
two operational CTG commanders are Commo-
dore Alastair Ross, UKN, and Rear Admiral Elio 
Bolongaro, Italian Navy, who is also Commander 
of WEU's "Contingency Maritime Force". The 
third task group is commanded by Rear Admiral 
James R. Stark, United States Navy. 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft operate under 
operational control of CCTF 440 through the 
Commander of Combined Task Force 431 Rear 
Admiral John Coleman, United States Nary. 
Participating forces 
Surface ships: 
HMCS Halifax (F 330), frigate 
(Canada); 
HMCS Preserver (D 280), support 
ship (Canada); 
HMDS Peter Tordenskiold (F 356) 
frigate (Denmark); ' 
FS Premier Maitre L'Her (F 792), fri-
gate (France); 
APPENDIX IT 
FS Georges Leygues (D 640), des-
troyer (France); 
FGS Augsburg (F 213), frigate 
(Germany); 
HS Kimon (D 218), destroyer 
(Greece); 
ITS Aliseo (F 574), frigate (Italy); 
ITS Chimera (F 556), corvette 
(Italy); 
ITS Lupo (F 564), frigate (Italy); 
HNLMS van Kinsbergen (F 809), 
frigate (The Netherlands); 
HNLMS Jacob v. Heemskerk 
(F 812), frigate (The Netherlands); 
HNOMS Narvik (F 304), frigate 
(Norway); 
NRP Corte Real (F 332), frigate 
(Portugal); 
SPS Cataluna (F 73), frigate (Spain); 
SPS Santa Maria (F 81 ), frigate 
(Spain); 
TCG Turgutreis (D 241), destroyer 
(Turkey); 
HMS Birmingham (D 86), frigate 
(United Kingdom); 
HMS Chatham (F 87), frigate 
(United Kingdom); 
USS Comte De Grasse (DD 974), 
destroyer (United States); 
USS Bainbridge (CGN 25), cruiser 
(United States). 
CTF 440 is also supported by the United States 
AEGIS cruiser USS Philippine Sea (CG 58). 
Fighter aircraft 
Eight Italian Air Force Tornado aircraft are 
available to support Operation Sharp Guard from 
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their home base at Gioia del Colle. These aircraft 
can contribute to the defence of ships from attacks 
from surface ships. Other aircraft from allied 
forces operating in the area also contribute to this 
support. 
Maritime patrol aircraft 
Continuous maritime air patrol support to 
the naval forces of CTF 440 is provided with 
assets from nine NATO and WEU nations: 
Canada (CP-140 Aurora), France (Atlantique), 
Germany (Atlantique ), Italy (Atlantique ), the 
Netherlands (P-3C), Portugal (P-3P), Spain 
(P-3B), United Kingdom (Nimrod), United States 
(P-3C). The above aircraft operate from the air 
bases at Sigonella (Sicily) and Elmas (Sardinia), 
in Italy. 
NATO airborne early warning 
Eight E-3A and two E-3D from NATO's 
Airborne Early Warning Force (NAEWF) are sup-
porting Operation Sharp Guard, as well as NATO 
Operation Deny Flight. The E-3A aircraft are 
flown, from their home bases at Geilenkirchen, 
Germany, and forward operating bases at Aviano 
and Trapani, Italy, and Preveza, Greece, by multi-
national crews provided by eleven NATO nations 
(Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey 
and the United States). TheE-3D aircraft from the 
United Kingdom's Number 8 Squadron operate 
from their home base at Royal Air Force Station 
Waddington, United Kingdom, as well as Aviano 
and Trapani, Italy. French E-3F aircraft operating 
from the French air base in Avord and Italian air 
base at Trapani under the auspices of WEU are 
also participating. 
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